way up, they did their thing', the other said.

A commentator, Delphine Serouraga, Director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, observed that leaders in a position to make decisions that were 'socially and politically correct' were, in some cases, also benefiting personally from the imbalance. To redress the situation might involve them 'giving up some of their personal wealth'. Meadowlands might need not merely 'more efficient service delivery', the reporter added in conclusion, but perhaps 'a more fundamental debate about who gets what'. Viewers proved more likely, in response to this second vector, to regard the inequality as a spur to remedial action, rather than part of the general background of life.

Peace journalism proved effective in prompting viewers to make different meanings and draw different conclusions. The exercise can be conceived in terms of framing. In an influential account, Robert Entman defines framing in the following terms:

'To select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation'.

Watching peace journalism led most viewers to define problems as structural, rather than caused by individual perpetrators; to interpret causes as systemic and shared, requiring cooperative solutions as treatment recommendations. Their moral evaluations emphasised sadness over situations that put people in danger or misfortune, whereas those who watched the original versions were more likely to apportion blame.

Our research shows that peace journalism works. It does indeed prompt its audiences to make different meanings about key conflict issues, to be more receptive to nonviolent responses. At a time when fears are being expressed that commercial funding models will be unable to sustain good journalism, that is an invitation to non-commercial funders to step in. And if they sponsor initiatives in peace journalism, they can be confident, on the basis of our findings, that they will be making an important contribution to societal resources for peace.

Note

The research by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, titled A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict, is sponsored by the Australian Research Council and the University of Sydney, with partnership by the International Federation of Journalists and Act for Peace. Jake's book of the same name will be published by Routledge in 2013.

Peace in Action

3

Truth, reconciliation and peacebuilding

John Braithwaite

There are many possible sequences of truth, justice and reconciliation after conflict. Finding the apt path for a particular place and time requires peacebuilders to network across learning organizations that are responsive to local voices. However, we might see Rotary International as a contributory to that kind of learning. Peacebuilding is construed as a craft of responsive governance. It requires patience and resilience because most peace initiatives fail, though most successes are built on the foundation of prior failures. Data from the first 12 cases of the Peacebuilding Compared project (http://peacebuilding.sbu.edu.au) are used to develop the following themes in many respects oriented to what Suzanne Karstedt calls the longue durée of peacebuilding.

The key idea in this paper, the longue durée of peacebuilding and the networked governance of peace, seem appropriate ideas for a Rotary International volume. Rotary's peace work has not been oriented to short termism. In its peace education work Rotary takes reconciliation seriously by building and supporting the long-term development of networks of peacebuilders.

Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission built on the earlier experience of Latin American truth commissions, truth and memory have been seen as fundamental to peacebuilding. And national transitional justice institutions have been seen as the appropriate vehicles for their realisation. Through analysing very different cases of peacebuilding, this chapter concludes that expanding zones of bottom-up truth or reconciliation often enables top-down truth-telling or reconciliation to take root. Moreover, it finds that reconciliation can occur on a foundation of only very partial truth. The Truth and Reconciliation model tends to assume that truth precedes reconciliation. In some of the cases we consider, it is reconciliation that opens a path to high-integrity truth-seeking. This leads to the conclusion that understanding how peace is built first requires an uncoupling of truth and reconciliation in a specific context. Second, where partial truths and reconciliations do support each other, we must analyse both truth-reconciliation and reconciliation-truth sequences. Third, we consider the virtues of a networked governance of reconciliation. The database for these conclusions is the first twelve cases of the Peacebuilding Compared project. This is a project which over 20 years aspires to code 670 variables for the major armed conflicts that have afflicted the world since 1990.
Post-conflict peacebuilding in Indonesia

The first volume of the Peacebuilding Compared project dealt with armed conflicts across the Indonesian archipelago in Aceh, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and West Papua that raged just before and after the turn of the millennium (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Cookson & Dann, 2010). We connect this spike in serious armed conflict in so many provinces of Indonesia to the collapse of the Suharto regime, which in turn was connected to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.

Suharto was simply unable to manage this crisis. Indonesia, like all the cases discussed in this essay, experienced Durkheimian (1952) anomie as a factor in the onset of the conflict, a condition that was only slowly transcended after conflict in all those cases (except West Papua where anomie and conflict has never ceased). Anomie in this context meant firstly that the settled rules of the political game became unsettled; secondly, who had the legitimacy to wield power was also up for grabs.

One of the contenders for wielding power was the Indonesian military. With the rules of the game unsettled many in the military took the initiative using the tools that they most decisively controlled, armed force (Bertrand, 2004). Often they hedged political bets by using proxies such as militias that they armed. This gave generals deniability in circumstances of civilian control returning.

Organizational power for political mobilisation was thin across most parts of Indonesia. The collapse of Indonesian democracy between the 1950s and the 1990s meant that there were not really political parties available for capture by ambitious new political leaders. In many parts of the country religious organizations were the readymade vehicle for mobilisation of large numbers of people (van Klinken, 2007). In some parts, indigenous organizations also had formidable capacity to mobilise large numbers of people. Hence, it was not surprising that much of the Indonesian conflict involved mobilizing military, religious and ethnic organizations.

When peace processes were settled in these conflicts (with the exception of West Papua) reconciliation between the military and civilian society, inter-religious and inter-ethnic reconciliation were all therefore important. There was more than a little in common among these three types of reconciliation. The most impressive of them was interfaith reconciliation between Muslims and Christians. After 2002, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan took over from Indonesia as the part of the world with the most serious terrorism problem. During a decade when terrorist bombings have steeply increased, particularly in these three countries, it has equally steeply declined in Indonesia. Before September 11, 2001, the Western media paid little attention to the fact that, for example, bombs went off simultane-
meant not just forgetting, but lies. The most common kind of lie was widespread blaming of ‘outside provocateurs’ for atrocities that were mostly committed by locals against locals. To some degree the provocateur script came up in all of our Indonesian cases, mostly, though not always, in contexts where its truth-value for actually explaining events was limited.

I have been associated with the development of a theory of restorative justice where high integrity truth seeking is central and temporally prior to reconciliation (Braithwaite 2002; 2005). Our Indonesian data questions the centrality of a sequence from truth to reconciliation. So how was reconciliation without truth accomplished in most of these cases (though definitely not in West Papua)? Thousands of meetings across these conflict areas in the early 2000s were called reconciliation meetings. Some included only a dozen or so leaders; quite a number had hundreds of participants, some over a thousand. The most common number was more like 30 people who were key players from two neighbouring villages or the Christians and Muslims from the same village, who had been at war with each other not long before. Other meetings were called inter-faith dialogues, others indigenous rituals bearing various customary names for reconciliation meetings among the ethnic groups of that locality.

Sorrow, even remorse, for all the suffering was commonly expressed at these meetings. Tears flowed and there were often deeply sincere hugs of forgiveness. But no one ever, in any of the reports we received of these meetings, admitted to specific atrocities that they or their group perpetrated against the other. Sometimes the ethnic group that ended with control of the village would invite back only a small number of trusted families of the ethnic other as a first step toward rebuilding trust. Much of the discussion at these reintegration meetings was with government officials and humanitarian agencies that attended to offer practical assistance with the resettling of people into their old villages. A common gesture of practical reconciliation was for a Christian community to start rebuilding a mosque they had burnt down or a Muslim community to start rebuilding a church they had razed. The cleansed group might be invited back to the village to see this for themselves as a sign of the sincerity of the desire for reconciliation and to give advice on how to do the rebuilding. Then they might do some work together on the project.

When they returned, their former enemies would often organize a moving welcome ceremony for them. They would be showered with gifts of food and other necessities from a steady stream of visits to their home by former enemies who, before the conflict, had also been friends and neighbours. The point of this summary narrative is not to say this always happened. There was also bitterness, unpleasant exchanges and people who were shunned. My objective is to give a sense of how reconciliation without truth worked when it did work, which was quite often. When a mosque substantially built by Christian hands was opened, the Christian community would be invited and sometimes Christian prayers would be said inside the mosque. We also found rituals of everyday life to be important to reconciliation. Christians attending the funeral of a respected Muslim leader and embracing Muslims soon after the conflict were sites of reconciliation. So were Christians being invited to the celebration of Muhammad’s birthday, Muslims to Christmas celebrations, to halal bi halal (a forgiveness ritual among neighbours that occurs at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), and so on. In our interviews we were told of simple acts of kindness that were important for building reconciliation bottom-up—a Muslim cleric who picked up an old Christian man in his car and dropped him at the market, the loan of a Muslim lawnmower to cut the grass of the Christian church. Peace zones where peace markets could operate to reopen old trading relationships were central to the trust-building of the Baku Bae reconciliation movement in Maluku. All these were included among the great variety of locally creative and meaningful ways that people reconciled without ever speaking the truth to one another about who was responsible for crimes.

For all our Indonesian evidence of reconciliation being real, and for all the statements in our fieldwork notes that informants believed it contributed greatly to what they expected to be the likelihood of long-term peace in their communities, our theoretical prejudice is still to believe that while non-truth and reconciliation is so much better than no reconciliation, truth and reconciliation would be an even more solid foundation for the future; truth, justice and reconciliation better still. Our findings imply that we should be open to the possibility Susanne Karstedt (2005; 2010) discovered in post World War II Germany. Post-conflict justice in Europe created a space for ‘moving on’ based on a non-truth that just those in Hitler’s inner circle who were convicted at Nuremberg were culpable. But that distorted truth laid a foundation for subsequent testimony that gave voice to victims of the Holocaust. Victim testimony from the 1960s ultimately became a basis for an acknowledgement of the full, terrible truth. Then deeper reconciliation between the German people and their former enemies and victims occurred. Karstedt’s (2005, p. 4) message is that it is the ‘longue durée’ of truth and memory through victim narrative that matters and in the case of Germany denial and forgetting was replaced in the long term by truth and memory.

Gotong royong is apparent in many of the examples of non-truth and reconciliation we have discussed. Healing happens through sharing in community work projects, in building that mosque or school together. Indonesians are good at having fun when they work together; they bond through work more than Westerners do partly because the division of labour in village society is less divided, but
also because sharing communal work and community welfare burdens is overlaid with cultural meanings of gotong royong. Back breaking work that must be done to rebuild might be seen as a burden on reconciliation in the West, infused with resentment as people struggle to do it. In Indonesia, it is much more a resource for reconciliation.

**Peacebuilding organizations as learning organizations that practice a craft**

The ancient Thucydidean, Machiavellian and Hobbesian trinity of fear, honour and interest as motives for war (Donnelly, 2008, p. 43) are evident in the first dozen cases of Peacebuilding Compared. Yet in Indonesia they are evident in uniquely Indonesian forms, in Bougainville in Bougainvillean forms, and so on. Roger MacGinty (2008) argues that Western peace support has become non-reflexive, uniform, off-the-shelf ‘peace from IKEA: a flat-pack peace made from standardized components’. This description does not fit the distinctively Indonesian approaches to crafting peace that we have glimpsed in the paragraphs above, nor in the Bougainvillean ones in the paragraphs below. In fact, much of the reconciliation work was indigenous, pre-Islamic, and not especially ‘Indonesian’; it was to a degree pelita-gondrong in Maluku, hibua lanto in Halmahera, maroso in Poso and Pesuisfiek in Aceh, among other local reconciliation traditions that are even more variegated among Dayaks, Papuans and in the next section among Bougainvilleans.

An ambition of the Peacebuilding Compared project is to learn from diversity. Yet we fear MacGinty is right that an indigenous diversity in peacebuilding of disparate strengths and weaknesses is being co-opted by templated Western orthodoxy (‘the liberal peace’). MacGinty warns, however, against romanticizing indigenous or traditional peacemaking of the kinds we describe. The awful ongoing suffering in West Papua today makes it difficult to romanticize Indonesian peacebuilding. Yet during questions after presentations we have given on this work at certain centres of intellectual excellence in the West, there was evident a distaste for illiberal aspects of Indonesian peacebuilding that can close minds to seeing its strengths. Truth, justice, electoral politics and the rule of law can be romanticized as well.

The Regional Assistance Mission for Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been one of the most intensive and extended of peacekeeping operations. It concentrated on building core pillars of the state (Braithwaite, Dimen, Allen, Braithwaite & Charlesworth, 2010). At first RAMSI’s state-building was not very responsive to either local voices or to root causes of the conflict. Braithwaite, Dimen, Allen, Braithwaite and Charlesworth (2010) conceive of peacebuilding as the craft of learning to be more responsive. They find that RAMSI slowly became more of a
learning organization. Responsive peacebuilding involves overcoming fear of ‘mission creep’. It means seeing ‘peacebuilding creep’ as about mission contraction as much as mandate expansion. The craft of peace as learned in the Solomon Islands was about enabling spaces for dialogue that defined where the mission should pull back to allow local actors to expand the horizons of their peacebuilding ambition.

Based on a consideration of South African data on truth and reconciliation, particularly the work of Gibson (2004), Braithwaite (2005) published the model of high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation in Figure 1 in the year that Peacebuilding Compared data collection got under way. Sad to say, not one of the first 12 cases of Peacebuilding Compared fits this model. Zero out of 12 is a discouraging hit rate for a social theorist interested in elaborating starting models iteratively from new data. Nevertheless, in the next section, we consider the case that approaches closest to fitting the model of Figure 1, Bougainville.

‘Restorative Peace’ in Bougainville

Bougainville is perhaps an even better fit to the top part of Figure 1 than South Africa. It is certainly more about truth and reconciliation than the non-truth and reconciliation described for Indonesia (Howley, 2002). Where Figure 1 does not fit Bougainville’s civil war for independence from Papua New Guinea between 1988 and 1998 is that Bougainvilleans on both sides of the conflict enjoyed total immunity from prosecution. So there is for Bougainville no bottom loop to Figure 1.

Reconciliation meetings in Bougainville had similarities in format to many of the Indonesian reconciliations, even some ritual commonalities such as burying an object to symbolise the permanence of the peace and to signify that terrible things could befall anyone who broke the agreement. Across the region, many different ethnic groups, in Timor-Leste as well as Indonesia, Bougainville and Solomon Islands, believed that an unpleasant death or other terrible misfortune would be the consequence for the person who led the breaking of a peace agreement. This gave indigenous peacemaking much more holding power than internationally mediated agreements.

The main difference between reconciliation meetings in Bougainville versus Indonesia was that in Bougainville they very often led to individual admissions of serious crimes including murder and rape, whereas this never happened in Indonesia to our knowledge. The reconciliation sequence in Bougainville tended to be first an indication of a willingness to accept collective responsibility for harming another group. For example, a company of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) might be willing to admit that they burnt a particular village to the ground killing inhabitants. Many rounds of negotiation would then occur over the terms of what was to be apologised for and what compensation would be paid. Agreement to return bones of victims and bring gifts of pigs was common.

While initial negotiation of a collective responsibility ritual for a BRA company might take many months or years, it would not normally result in individual admissions of rape or murder. If the collective reconciliation went well, however, without pay-back violence, with forgiveness rather than hatred, then individuals often found the courage to ask for forgiveness from a particular family for the murder of their son/husband, the rape of their daughter. It is hard to imagine that this widespread phenomenon could have happened without the general policy of amnesty and without the confidence that traditional reconciliation could deliver. Note another divergence of the Bougainville experience from Figure 1 here. While collective truth-telling generally preceded reconciliation, individual truth-telling more often followed from collective reconciliation. So the truth-reconciliation sequence is much more complex than in Figure 1.

Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy and Dunn (2010) conclude that wave after wave of reconciliation has persisted for more than a decade, and continues into the future. These reconciliations have mostly concerned the predominant form of violence which was Bougainvilleans in the BRA versus other Bougainvilleans who were protecting communities from criminalized BRA elements, or who were working with Papua New Guinea in support of national unity. Reconciliation between Bougainvilleans and the government of Papua New Guinea still has a long way to go, however, as it does between the BRA and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). There were many complex dimensions to this conflict that still require reconciliation. The war actually started as a more local dispute over the huge Australian-owned Panguna copper mine, pollution from which devastated local lands. Local landowners were dissatisfied that most of the royalties for the mine went to the national government rather than local landowners. Reconciliation between the mining company, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, and Bougainvilleans is yet to be achieved. An obstacle here is that the company fears ritual apology would expose it to liability in the courts. Yet this reconciliation to some extent holds a key to international reconciliation among Bougainville, Australia and Papua New Guinea.

Every village-level story of reconciliation was unique in Bougainville. The village in Selau where John Braithwaite lived as a student in 1969 had been the base of C Company of the BRA. Starting in 1990, when the war became chaotic, voices in the village began to be raised in favour of adopting a position of neutrality. Women from across Selau organised a peace march followed by an all-night vigil for peace that it is claimed 5000 attended—most of the population of Selau
(van Tongeren, Brenk, Hellema & Verhoeven, 2005, p. 124). The war had opened up some old internal divisions. There were allegations that the local BRA commander had used his position to murder a man who was much disapproved of because of sorcery. He was also fearfully reviled by many because he had married his own daughter. In turn, there were allegations that the combat death of that local BRA commander was ‘friendly fire’, which was in fact ‘unfriendly fire’ from loyal kin of the murdered sorcerer within C Company. Others dispute this. Reconciliation within the area and between the PNGDF and the village was accomplished in August 1991 after the women seized the peacemaking agenda with the council of chiefs and the village declared itself neutral (Saovana-Spriggs 2007, p. 195).

Both the villagers and the PNGDF officer who attended the reconciliation ceremony remember it as moving and a turning point towards local peace. It was a peace that created an island of civility (Kaldor, 1999)—a peace zone from which peace could spread—which demonstrated the advantages of peaceful neutrality to those living in adjacent conflict areas. The PNGDF loaded all the BRA weapons from that part of Selau onto a helicopter and dropped them into the deep water just offshore from the village as part of the ceremony. This sealed the peace and the sealed disposal in this little corner of Bougainville many years before it arrived elsewhere. The story of such a single village reveals why we must always be circumspect with the grand narrative of the Bougainville peace that says it was negotiated at Burnham and Lincoln. It was in fact a cumulative peace that took quantum leaps thanks to New Zealand leadership at the Burnham and Lincoln peace talks.

The Selau region has a population of only 7000, but the chiefs told me in April 2006 that they had participated in 87 separate formal reconciliations by then. While hundreds of large reconciliations have been held across Bougainville for big groups, and thousands of smaller ones in relation to hamlets, families or individuals, a widespread perspective a decade after the war is that most of the reconciliations that are needed still remain to be done.

The peace in Bougainville is two stories. There is the story of top-down peace ultimately negotiated under New Zealand auspices in 1997 and 1998, and ultimately under UN facilitation of the political settlement between PNG and Bougainvillean factions in 1999, 2000 and 2001. And there is the story of zones of local reconciliation (see Boege 2006, p. 11) starting soon after the onset of war and continuing the struggle to expand its reach two decades later. Most accounts assume the top-down story is the master narrative and the bottom-up reconciliations are subsidiary. But in important ways the bottom-up micro-narratives subsume and infuse the top-down peace.
### Table 1: Accomplishing peace through political settlement, legal justice and restorative justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How peace is accomplished</th>
<th>Political settlement</th>
<th>Adjudicated wrongdoing based on legal justice</th>
<th>Reconciliation of wrongdoing based on restorative justice/traditional reconciliation</th>
<th>Provisional interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unresolved conflict</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Hobbesian struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Burma</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political settlement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Realist peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ignoring war crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>North/South Korea</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political settlement and rule of law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Liberal peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Nazi Germany</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political settlement and reconciliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Restorative peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bougainville</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political settlement, rule of law and reconciliation Attempted in Timor-Leste and South Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Republican peace¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure rule of law</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Peace by rule of international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hard to identify a clear case</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and reconciliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Peace by restorative international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hard to identify a clear case</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure reconciliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Restorative peace without political settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hard to identify; some preventive diplomacy could approach it</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Variation in how bottom-up and top-down are truth and reconciliation ⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How peace is accomplished</th>
<th>Bottom-up truth</th>
<th>Top-down truth</th>
<th>Bottom-up reconciliation</th>
<th>Top-down reconciliation</th>
<th>Provisional interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up truth and reconciliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Truthful local reconciliations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bougainville</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down truth and non-reconciliation Chile²</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Pure Truth Commission model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down truth and reconciliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>National Truth and Reconciliation Commission model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth and reconciliation bottom-up–top-down</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>National and local Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Timor-Leste</em> (short-term attempt at it)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Barnett’s (2006) concept of republican peace would require of the political settlement that it include commitment to a constitution with a separation of powers and that the settlement be based on deliberative politics that is broadly representative.

2 There was some bottom-up truth in Chile from NGOs, though nothing like the breadth of local bottom-up truth in Bougainville.

3 There were some important attempts at bottom-up truth and reconciliation in South Africa as well that were not widely based.

4 This table lists only half the combinations of the four columns possible for these variables. We expect some of the hidden combinations will be brought to life as Peacebuilding Compared accumulates new cases.
Table 2: Variation in how bottom-up and top-down are truth and reconciliation. This table lists only half the combinations of the four columns possible for these variables. We expect some of the hidden combinations will be brought to life as Peacebuilding Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-down reconciliation</th>
<th>Forgiving and forget</th>
<th>Remember and resent</th>
<th>Feigned forgetting, elites forgive (but hatred hides in people’s hearts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiving and forget</td>
<td>Remember and resent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remember and resent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feigned forgetting, elites forgive (but hatred hides in people’s hearts)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While peacekeepers were rarely hands-on mediators of the indigenous reconciliation, one of their greatest contributions was to initiate conversations between local enemies who were afraid of each other, allowing initial meetings to occur under the peacekeepers’ security umbrella.

Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy and Dunn (2010) conclude that the very top-down architecture of the peace agreement that has been such a strength is also potentially its greatest weakness. This is because it is far from clear whether there is credible commitment of the PNG Parliament and of regional powers to the final crunch of the peace deal. If Bougainville votes in a referendum for independence in the course of this second decade of the twenty-first century—as provided for in the peace deal—and Papua New Guinea refuses to honour the wishes expressed in that vote, young men will be motivated to return to arms to vindicate the blood of their fathers. The sequence of credible commitments so honourably completed in the peace process to date could tragically heighten a sense of betrayal if the will of the people in the agreed referendum is dishonoured. Political leadership is needed in Port Moresby and regional preventive diplomacy is required to grasp the nettle of that final commitment. This can be delivered alongside an honourable and open political campaign to persuade the people of Bougainville that they could be better off if they vote for autonomous provincial government integrated within the state of Papua New Guinea.

The Bougainville case shows that bottom-up reconciliation achieves only fragile progress when war rages around it. Yet we also found that early reconciliations paved the way to a political settlement. So we hypothesise that the commonly expressed wisdom during our fieldwork in the corridors of the United Nations in New York that ‘peacekeeping cannot work if there is no peace to keep’ goes too far. While a political settlement can create peace without genuine truth and reconciliation, and while truth and reconciliation might be unlikely to secure peace without a political settlement, truth, justice and reconciliation could be more than just value added on top of a settlement. Rather, we hypothesise that bottom-up political settlement and bottom-up restorative justice form a virtuous circle that consolidates deeply sustainable peace. Peacekeeping Commander Brigadier Bruce Osborn’s metaphor was of the peace as building a house that acquired strong foundations because of traditional reconciliation and sturdy walls because of the architecture of the peace: “The foundations of the house were the Bougainvillians people. The walls were the various parties to the peace process. You had to shape, strengthen and unify those walls in order to support the roof, which was the reconciliation government, the one voice of Bougainville” (Osborn 2001, p. 55).

While Bougainvillians identified with and built Brigadier Osborn’s house, they now have the space to contemplate whether it could be better buttressed by
some national and international architecture. Simply because local reconciliation continues to progress reasonably well, gradually expanding its scope within Bougainville, it does not necessarily follow that a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the Bougainville war would be redundant for Papua New Guinea. No national reconciliation ceremony was ever conducted for the Bougainville war in Port Moresby.

Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Reddy and Dunn (2010) characterise Bougainville through the following two comparative tables as a ‘Restorative peace’ (Table 1) based on bottom-up reconciliation and a top-down architecture of cleverly sequenced commitments to take the next steps toward deepening the furrows of the peace.

Over the next 20 years of the Peacebuilding Compared project, we will follow the ways such different dispensations succeed and fall in the resilience of peace. For the moment, Tables 1 and 2 do no more than float only provisional interpretations (as opposed to variables we code) in the hope they might provoke conversations to clarify and elaborate them. So we think it is premature in the history of the project for claims on what is theoretically at stake down the right-hand columns of Tables 1 and 2. That is better grounded in the experience of more cases followed up for longer. For the moment, these tables help us to see how distinctive the Bougainville peace was and the way it was distinctive. And really, that is the only claim we advance for Tables 1 and 2 at this early stage.

Partial peacebuilding: Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and the longue durée

Two other cases where Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork has been completed, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, can be seen as both having qualified ‘yes’ entries in all the columns of Tables 1 and 2, though in some cases heavily qualified. They both have clear top-down political settlements, in Solomons signed after many earlier top-down peace agreements collapsed (as in Bougainville and Aceh). The Solomon Islands has been one of the most prosecutorial transitional justice processes, if not the most, the world has seen (Braithwaite, Dinnen, Allen, Braithwaite & Charlesworth 2010). All the major militant leaders, two former prime ministers, a number of other former cabinet ministers and a significant proportion of the security forces went to prison and thousands of others were arrested. ‘Reconciliation of wrongdoing based on restorative justice/traditional reconciliation’ (Table 1, column 3), on the other hand, has been disappointing and substantially corrupted by standover demands for compensation by militants and political leaders (Fraenkel, 2004; Moore, 2004) until very recently. Archbishop Tutu visited Solomon Islands in 2009 to turn a new page with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In Timor-Leste, the reservations over the last two columns of ‘Yes’ entries in Table 1 are rather the reverse of those for Solomon Islands. While Timor-Leste did have a serious crimes process, it only led to punishment for a handful of Timorese as all the indicted Indonesians were shielded in Indonesia and Indonesian criminal courts launched no prosecutions that stuck. On the other hand, many of the traditional reconciliation processes over crimes of the conflict were widely regarded as successful in Timor-Leste.

Conclusion: partial truth and reconciliation in the longue durée

In both Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands the journey to bottom-up and top-down truth and reconciliation has been flawed, sometimes corrupted, and is far from complete. But in both cases there is a journey that continues. Both truth and reconciliation are always partial; the recursive relationships of one to the other turn out to be much more complex than can be captured by a diagram such as Figure 1. In wars, all sides lies at times. Sometimes they lie a lot and systematically propagandize the lies. While conflict zones are afflicted by many utterly false rumours, at the same time there are also of course many versions of the truth that have merit. We have also seen that there are many bottom-up, top-down and middle-out versions of reconciliation, some with meanings like gotong royong that may not travel from one culture to another. There is always the possibility that creative peacemakers can find a path to truth and reconciliation from a past of non-truth and very partial pockets of certain forms of reconciliation.

As Karstedt (2005; 2010) argues, there is a need to remain open to diverse ways the longue durée of reconciliation might unfold. The need for this openness does seem apparent in all the Peacebuilding Compared cases to date. Negative entries in Tables 1 and 2 above can become positive as a result of renewed initiatives decades after an initial peace. Obversely, positive entries can become negative ones. Even when that happens, peacebuilders can be resilient, renewing new rounds of bottom-up, middle-out and top-down peacemaking. If there is one thing we might learn from comparative histories of peacebuilding such as these it is that only the resilient, who have the attitude that most of their peace initiatives will fail, are likely to be rewarded with peaceful institutions.

Note

1. This essay is an expanded and revised version of an earlier paper published in Contemporary Social Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, “Partial Truth and Reconciliation in the Longue Durée”.
References


