If shaming is crucial to crime control, then is not the task of controlling crime hopeless in modern urbanized societies? It is argued here that any such pessimism must be qualified by a broader understanding of shame in human history. First, the article considers the arguments of Elias that shame became more important in the affect structure of citizens with the demise of feudalism. Elias did not consider the movement away from shame and towards brutal punishment in crime control directed at the lower classes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This period culminated in a demonstration of the failure of stigmatization and punitive excess, opening the way for reintegrative ideals to gather support in the Victorian era and beyond. Finally, drawing on Goffman, it is argued that there are some neglected ways in which shaming can have more power in the city than in the village. Overall, there is no structural inevitability about the impotence of shaming in industrialized societies; there is no inexorable march with modernization towards a society where shaming does not count.

My recent book, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Braithwaite 1989) advances the theory that nations with low crime rates, and periods of history where crime is more effectively controlled, are those where shaming has the greatest social power. For shaming to attain its maximum effectiveness, it must be of a reintegrative sort, avoiding stigmatization. Stigmatization is shaming which creates outcasts, where ‘criminal’ becomes a master status trait that drives out all other identities, shaming where bonds of respect with the offender are not sustained. Reintegrative shaming, in contrast, is disapproval dispensed within an ongoing relationship with the offender based on respect, shaming which focuses on the evil of the deed rather than on the offender as an irremediably evil person, where degradation ceremonies are followed by ceremonies to decertify deviance, where forgiveness, apology, and repentance are culturally important. The
key contention, which I will not defend here, is that societies where shaming of criminal conduct is both potent and reintegrative are societies with low crime rates.

Most of us refrain most of the time from crimes like murder not from any rational calculation of the costs of incarceration or the costs of the electric chair, but because murder is simply off our deliberative agenda as something to calculate about. Murder is unthinkable as a way of solving our problems of daily living. The key to crime prevention is to understand what constitutes this unthinkable-ness. My answer is reintegrative shaming rather than stigmatization. Stigmatization can be counter-productive through increasing the attractions for outcasts of criminal subcultures. What criminal subcultures do is provide symbolic resources that render the unthinkable thinkable.

Urbanization is posited in the theory as one of the structural variables that enfeeble the communitarianism that makes shaming possible. At the same time, I am anxious to qualify any excessive structural determinism about this by emphasizing the low crime rates of Tokyo and by pointing to the growing power of reintegrative shaming and the declining crime rates in the Victorian era, a period of unprecedented urbanization (Braithwaite 1989: 111-18). Cynics about the significance of the theory latch on to the urbanization and industrialization question. Whenever I present a seminar on Crime, Shame and Reintegration, a member of the audience always asks something like the following: ‘Yes, I accept that the nature of shaming is important to understanding why there are such vast differences between societies in crime rates. But the practical implications of your theory for dealing with crime are small. They amount to a plea to turn back the clock from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft [Tonnies 1887], from urban back to folk society [Redfield, 1947]. But urbanization and industrialization are facts that cannot be reversed; there is no practical import to a theory that amounts to a romantic plea for a bygone communitarian era.’ The purpose of this article is to suggest that standard comment reflects a simplistic understanding of shame in human history. The understanding I will squeeze into the next few pages will be only slightly more complex and limited to Western history, even though I suspect a more interesting treatment could be given by reflecting on Japanese, Chinese, or Australian Aboriginal history. Limited though it will be, I hope it will be an advance on the way criminologists are wont to think historically about shame.

First, I will consider Norbert Elias’s account of the rise of shame in Western history. Then I will argue that Elias did not take account of some important historical reversals in the influence of shame; and that he also ignored the way social control based on violence rather than shame escalated in dealings with the lower classes just as the prominence of shaming in upper-class social relations increased. To highlight the theme that there is no unidirectional historical trend either towards or away from shame-based social control with modernization, it is shown how the nature of interdependencies in modern urban social relations can actually increase rather than decrease our exposure to shame.

*The Civilizing Process*

The most important work on shame in Western history is Norbert Elias’s two volumes on *The Civilizing Process*. This was published in German in 1939, with the first volume appearing in English in 1978, the second in 1982. I confess I had not read this work
when I wrote *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*. This was a pity because Elias’s analysis of shame has some resonances with mine, and Elias accomplishes his analysis with a broader historical sweep than I dared contemplate.

Elias sees shame as in the ascendent rather than declining during the last 700 years. Two related structural changes were important in the rise of shaming as the predominant form of social control: the growth of the state as a monopolist of physical force, and the proliferation of a more elaborate division of labour. The process is strategically illustrated by the transformation of the nobility from a class of knights into a class of courtiers as physical force was progressively monopolized by a monarch. The monopolization of force created pacified social spaces. Prior to this pacification, with violence an unavoidable and everyday event, ‘a strong and continuous moderation of drives and affects is neither necessary, possible nor useful’ (Elias 1982: 236). In the feudal era characterized by a warrior upper class not only the warriors themselves, but all people, were threatened continually by acts of physical violence. The members of the warrior upper class enjoyed an extraordinary freedom in living out their feelings and passions through uninhibited satisfaction of sexual pleasure and gratification of vengeful impulses through acts of torture and dismemberment. This is consistent with the evidence we have on the extraordinarily high levels of homicide in the middle ages (Gurr 1980: 44). The evidence suggests a substantial downward trend in violent crime in England from the thirteenth century extending well into the twentieth century, a trend Gurr (1984: 295–353) attributes in part to strengthening internal controls against violence (see also Garland 1990: 233–4). During the sixteenth century, according to Elias, unrestrained passion became less a source of power and more an impediment to it. The affective make-up of the nobility changes as warriors became courtiers (whence ‘courtesy’), peddling influence at the court of a monarch who monopolized force. As La Bruyère wrote: ‘Life at court is a serious melancholy game, which requires of us that we arrange our pieces and our batteries, have a plan, follow it, foil that of our adversary, sometimes take risks and play on impulse. And after all our measures and mediations are in check, sometimes checkmate’ (quoted in Elias, 1982: 270).

Gradually the sword became less important than words and intrigue in competing for career success. This happened because the court of an absolute monarch was a social formation in which a great many people were continuously dependent on one another. Elias likens the court to a stock exchange, where the value of each individual is continually being formed and assessed. The most important determinants of this value are ‘the favour he enjoys with the king, the influence he has with other mighty ones, his importance in the play of courtly cliques’. In this subtle game of building value in a diplomatic market, ‘physical force and direct affective outbursts are prohibited and a threat to existence’ (Elias 1982: 271). What is demanded of each participant is self-control and exact knowledge of every other player with whom he is interdependent. A loss of affective control can devalue courtly opinion, threatening his whole position at court: ‘A man who knows the court is master of his gestures, of his eyes and his expression; he is deep, impenetrable. He dissimulates the bad turns he does, smiles at his enemies, suppresses his ill-temper, disguises his passions, disavows his heart, acts against his feelings’ (Elias 1982: 272). Elias illustrates how the affective structure of the warrior class was doomed through cases of bold and brave knights like the Duke of Montmorency being defeated by consummate courtiers such as Richelieu (Elias 1982: 272).
279). The role of the court and its associated institutions in dismantling the violent apparatus of feudalism remained influential for many centuries, even in England where the court waned earlier than on the continent as the pre-eminent site for politicking. The eighteenth-century reign of Beau Nash at the quasi-court of Bath civilized country squires by hastening the disappearance of the sword as the proper adornment of a gentleman’s thigh; as a result, the settling of disagreements with cold steel became increasingly infrequent (Trevelyan 1985: 385). Similarly, among humbler males, stabbing was replaced by the ‘civilized’ rules of fair play of the boxing ring. Even the boxing ring came to be viewed as uncivilized in early Victorian times, and withered away, only to be revived in the twentieth century, as Trevelyan (1973: 504) quaintly put it, as a ‘largely American’ preoccupation, ‘tempered with gloves’.

The ‘civilizing’ effect of courtly life was not as profound and all-embracing as that of later bourgeois society. The only interdependencies that mattered for the courtier and the court lady were those involving their peers and superiors at court. Elias uses etiquette texts and other sources to show how they felt no shame at the gaze or disapproval of their inferiors. ‘To receive inferiors when getting up and being dressed was for a whole period a matter of course. And it shows exactly the same stage of the shame-feeling when Voltaire’s mistress, the Marquise de Châtelet, shows herself naked to her servant while bathing in a way that casts him into confusion, and then with total unconcern scolds him because he is not pouring in the hot water properly’ (Elias 1978: 138). However, Duerr’s two-volume study (1988a,b) calls into question the way Elias has used historical materials on this and other questions (see also van Krieken, 1989). Duerr (1988a: 242–52) contends that in fact the record suggests that the Marquise de Châtelet’s behaviour in the passage quoted above was no common behaviour and therefore worth mentioning. Books on manners at court on which Elias relied were written with the moralistic intent of revealing the lack of manners at court and therefore were prone to exaggeration (Garland 1990: 230). Bourgeois society, according to Elias, set in motion a lasting transformation of the situation where superordinates need not care about shame in the eyes of subordinates. Gradually interdependencies with subordinate capitalists, professionals, workers, and consumers (customers who are allowed to be ‘always right’ according to the mythology of capitalism even if they are social inferiors) mean that it becomes possible for the upper classes to be shamed by their inferiors.

State formation, by creating a large zone of pacification, enables networks of transport, money, and trade to expand in conditions of physical safety. Thus, the absolutist central court not only constitutes its own interdependencies but also enables the constitution of a new set of bourgeois interdependencies. Both forms of interdependency have the effect of increasing the centrality of shame as a form of social control: ‘As the interdependence of men increases with the increasing division of labour, everyone becomes increasingly dependent on everyone else, those of high social rank on those socially inferior and weaker. The latter become so much the equals of the former that they, the socially superior, feel shame even before their inferiors’ (Elias 1978: 138). While Elias identifies an interesting trend toward the democratizing of shame, he overstates it. Today, shame remains class-structured in important ways and is profoundly gendered. White-collar workers will shamelessly indulge inconsiderate...
behaviour in the gaze of their secretary that they would never indulge in the presence of their boss.

Elias's longer time horizon makes a fascinating contrast with the analysis of community from the vantage of the shorter time-frame typically grasped by post-war criminologists. The latter bemoan the increased criminality which is a consequence of a loss of community, of a world where we care less about what others think of us. Perhaps it is partly because Elias writes from a vantage point which predates the short-term postwar rise in crime rates in the West that he can see the long-term growth in interdependency, shame, and the disciplining of violent impulses. Elias sees the skills needed to negotiate travel on roadways as an interesting model of what is needed to survive in a world of interdependencies within a complex division of labour. This need is for self-regulation which has been constituted by shame:

One should think of the country roads of a simple warrior society with a barter economy, uneven, unmetalled, exposed to damage from wind and rain. With a few exceptions, there is very little traffic; the main danger which man here represents for other men is an attack by soldiers or thieves. When people look around them, scanning the trees and hills or the road itself, they do so primarily because they must always be prepared for armed attack, and only secondarily because they have to avoid collision. Life on the main roads of this society demands a constant readiness to fight, and free play of the emotions in defence of one's life or possessions from physical attack. Traffic on the main roads of a big city in the complex society of our time demands a quite different moulding of the psychological apparatus. Here the danger of physical attack is minimal. Cars are rushing in all directions; pedestrians and cyclists are trying to thread their way through the melee of cars; policemen stand at the main crossroads to regulate the traffic with varying success. But this external control is founded on the assumption that every individual is himself regulating his behaviour with the utmost exactitude in accordance with the necessities of this network. The chief danger that people here represent for others results from someone in this bustle losing his self-control. A constant and highly differentiated regulation of one's own behaviour is needed for the individual to steer his way through the traffic. If the strain of such constant self-control becomes too much for an individual, this is enough to put himself and others in mortal danger. (Elias 1982: 233-4)

For Elias, shame as the feared experience which generates this self-control is not distinguished from guilt (see also Scheff 1990: 17). What we talk of today as guilt is, I think rightly, conceived as shame where the original sources of the shame in social interaction have been forgotten or suppressed:

Shame takes on its particular coloration from the fact that the person feeling it has done or is about to do something through which he comes into contradiction with people to whom he is bound in one form or another, and with himself, with the sector of his consciousness by which he controls himself. The conflict expressed in shame-fear is not merely a conflict of the individual with prevalent social opinion; the individual's behaviour has brought him into conflict with the part of himself that represents this social opinion. (Elias 1982: 292)

According to Elias, the transformation of the affect structure of the nobility from the knightly to the courtly structure based on shame commenced in the sixteenth century and continued through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this affect structure spread, transformed in important respects, to the bourgeoisie and later to all classes in Western societies. The more the
nobility sought to distinguish their 'civilized' manners and affect from those of the lower orders, the more incentive status-conscious members of the bourgeoisie had to model *civilité*. But more fundamentally, the bourgeoisie found themselves entwined in an even more complex set of interdependencies than the nobility: for them, to an even greater extent, the skills they needed for success were sensitivity to the disapproval of others, internalization of norms, and finesse in communicating disapproval to others. Just as the capitalist division of labour renders the bourgeoisie dependent on their inferiors, so that disapproval from below begins to matter to them, equally the nobility becomes economically dependent on the bourgeoisie. By the nineteenth century shame is a more democratic emotion.

The affect structure of the upper class colonizes the lower while the lower models the upper. But there is a two-way interpenetration of the structure of affect between classes. For example, Elias talks of upper-class penetration of the middle class with a code of manners and middle-class penetration of the upper class with a code of morals. He talks of affect control in the United States being more influentially shaped by the middle class than in England. However, Elias has remarkably little to say about how shame-based affect control is transmitted one step further down to the working class. Ultimately, of course, all classes travel on the complex road systems of contemporary cities which, for survival, require internalization and affect control. It might be pointed out, however, that it is young working-class males—the fraction of the population where control of aggression fails most often—who are most of those killed on our roads (Willett 1964). Elias does point out that with the success of capitalism, the working class accrues more disposable income, and therefore the upper class becomes more economically dependent on it. By the twentieth century chains of interdependency reach right down to the working class. He might also have said that the rise of trade unions and working-class influence in political parties increased downward dependency. He might have hypothesized that the working class would want to copy the *civilité* of higher classes in its quest for higher status, though this hardly seems as convincing as it is when the juxtaposition is between the rising bourgeoisie and the nobility. The fact that it is not so convincing is perhaps why Elias does not draw out this part of the argument. To build on the historical understanding we can obtain from Elias, we must think more critically about shaming and the working class. I attempt to tackle this problem in the next section.

In doing so, it will become clear that Elias exaggerated the extent to which shame and interdependency were democratized. While Elias (1978: 186) says that ‘The civilizing process does not follow a straight line,’ his theory remains one of more or less unilinear evolutionism. But the civilizing of violence has certainly not been all onwards and upwards—witness the subsequent butchering of Elias’s family at Auschwitz and Breslau. Yet the claim that Elias’s thesis is undermined by the Holocaust should not be made casually, because Elias was clear that violence does not disappear with civilization. Rather, violence is stored up ‘behind the scenes’, in prisons and military arsenals, ready to be unleashed in an emergency (Garland 1990: 223). But late modernity has not kept violence behind the scenes; most homes have violent events visible on their television screens every night of the year. Duerr correctly points out that late modernity has involved a frontal assault on shame wherein everything—nakedness, sex, violence, rage, fidelity—is turned into a consumer item. The commodification of the body, sexuality, and violence has probably weakened the threshold of shame in
relation to them (Duerr 1988b: 260). A rising divorce rate is another outcome of the
displacement of a sacred view of fidelity with a commodified view; when marriage
becomes just another consumer choice, this in turn has implications for the power of
family shaming. Perhaps most critically, as Scheff has pointed out, during the twentieth
century we became ashamed to be ashamed in certain ways and the very word shame
atrophied in our vocabulary (Scheff 1990: 16). Half a century after Elias wrote, the
withering of many types of shame has significantly reversed the most fundamental
unilinear trend in his theory. Moreover, I will suggest that while shame may have been
the ‘success story’ described by Elias in the context of upper-class social relations,
shame failed dismally during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in its extension
to the lower classes. Moreover, to suggest that the violence of the criminal justice system
was ‘behind the scenes’ seems a ruling-class perspective. One might argue that the
brutality of the criminal justice system was displayed on front stage for the lower
classes, and intentionally so.

Criminal Justice as Class Control in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

As trade expanded in the zones pacified by the new state monopolies of force, towns
and cities grew. There congregated in these urban spaces dispossessed persons with no
means of subsistence. Many survived by crime. The creation of such visible concentra-
tions of criminal poor motivated an escalation of the punitiveness of the criminal justice
system as an instrument of class control. The feudal criminal justice system had been
much less punitive, and more concerned with ironing out disputes between equals
(Weisser 1979: 100). But with the rise of the central state criminal justice began to
become more punitive and more concerned with class control. In the sixteenth century,
fining and banishment, which had been the staple feudal punishments, were progres-
sively overtaken by corporal punishments as the predominant sanctions—flogging,
mutilation, and even execution (Weisser 1979: 100–1; on the escalation of schoolroom
corporal punishment at the same time, see Stone 1977: 163–5). This shift was probably
connected to the practical problems of enforcement associated with criminalizing
reintegration; in seventeenth-century Amsterdam, for example, ‘infraction of banish-
ment’ (the crime of reintegration) was one of the more common offences the courts had
to deal with (Spierenburg 1984: 130–1).

But it was in the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth that the
problem of crime was most visibly identified as a growing urban lower-class problem
that required suppression with maximum brutality. In England during this period the
number of offences punishable by death increased from fifty to more than 200 (Weisser
1979: 138–9; Foucault 1977; see also Beattie 1984). A particularly crucial escalation
was the Black Acts (Thompson 1975) which, in addition to extending the scope of the
death penalty, removed procedural protections such as trial by jury for many (lower-
class) offences. In Holland as well, the period 1650–1750 saw an intensification of
scaffold punishment (Spierenburg 1984: 176–7). The repeal of the Black Acts in 1823
occurred near a turning-point away from two centuries of the most brutal regime of
criminal justice as class warfare. During these two centuries, there was limited pretence
of civilité in dealings with the lower classes (though see Spierenburg (1984: 191–265) on
growing ruling-class repugnance and shame at the sight of the awful violence meted
out). Reintegrative shaming may have been replacing outbursts of violence and passion
in the royal court, in bourgeois society, and in relations between the two, but for the lower classes these were the two centuries of their most brutal physical torture and their most vituperous stigmatization. In the eighteenth century, in France as well as England, the Enlightenment of critics of brutality and torture in the criminal justice system and the supporters of some steps towards equality before the law—Beccaria in Italy, Montesquieu and Voltaire in France, Howard in England—started to become influential in the criminal justice debate. Torture was abolished by law in most of Europe late in the eighteenth century (Spierenburg 1984: 190). Prisons, according to the reformers, were to be used in preference to corporal and capital punishment, and prisons were to be places of correction. The lower classes should be saved, reclaimed, and rehabilitated instead of bowed and brutalized.

According to Foucault (1977) the ideological shift away from horrific degradation ceremonies to signify the evil of the criminal, to inscribe the power of the monarch on the offending body, occurred because this signification began to backfire. The public spectacle of corporal and capital punishment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was all about shame, but clearly stigmatization rather than reintegrative shaming. Any reintegration for those who repented would be left to the Almighty after the twisted body of the felon expired. Shame was made explicit by hanging placards around the necks of those subjected to the public humiliation of torture. They were also forced to proclaim the blackness of their crimes and of themselves. The eighteenth-century French murderer Jean-Dominique Langlade was required to consecrate his torture by saying: ‘Listen to my horrible, infamous and lamentable deed, committed in the city of Avignon, where the memory of me is excretable, for having inhumanly violated the sacred rights of friendship’ (Foucault 1977: 66). Yet this stigmatization frequently did not go according to plan. Instead of forced repentance, victims often attacked the barbarity of the judge and the executioner, the injustice of the king. When this happened, the crowd often cheered, in some cases even being moved to turn on the executioner by physical attack or hurling projectiles (see also Hay 1975: 67–8).

In these executions, which ought to show only the terrorizing power of the prince, there was a whole aspect of the carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes. The shame was turned round; the courage, like the tears and cries of the condemned, caused offence only to the law. Fielding notes with regret: ‘To unite the ideas of death and shame is not so easy as may be imagined . . . I will appeal to any man who hath seen an execution, or a procession to an execution; let him tell me. When he hath beheld a poor wretch, bound in a cart, just on the verge of eternity, all pale and trembling with his approaching fate, whether the idea of shame hath ever intruded on his mind? Much less will the bold daring rogue, who glories in his present condition, inspire the beholder with any such sensation.’ (Foucault 1977: 61).

Executions became occasions for expressions of solidarity with petty property offenders, ceremonies which educated the masses to see the criminal justice system for what it was—an instrument of terror designed to pacify the lower classes (but see Spierenburg 1984: 92–109). As a victim of class injustice, of tyranny and excess, the condemned felon could now be celebrated as a hero: ‘Against the law, against the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, the constabulary or the watch, against taxes and their collectors, he appeared to wage a struggle with which one too easily identified’
SHAME AND MODERNITY

(Foucault 1977: 67). In England at the same time juries were refusing to convict for minor offences that would lead to the gallows (Trevelyan 1973: 348).

This was a dramatic historical affirmation of the thesis that stigmatization can engender subcultures of resistance to the law. So there was a retreat from the barbarism against the lower classes that had risen at the very time that civilité was rising among the upper classes. Reintegrative policies were put on the agenda for extension to the lower classes. Foucault saw two alternatives emerging in the eighteenth century. One was the reintegrative option of criminal justice practices which requalify guilty individuals as citizens. The other was the project of a prison institution which was a coercive technology of power to train, to discipline the body. Neither vision secured victory in the struggle that ensued between these two ideologies: to this day prison policy continues to be contested between defenders respectively of a rehabilitative and of a coercive disciplinary ideal.

What is clear is that the ideal of the body as a text on which torture inscribes the power of the sovereign was defeated and that reintegrative ideals gained momentum. Branding was abolished in Holland by a law of 1854 (Spierenburg 1984: 199) and disappeared throughout Europe by the mid-nineteenth century. Garland (1985) disagrees with Foucault on the timing of such changes, at least for Britain. While seeing some tendencies in the earlier Victorian period for the dominant ideology to shift from despising and outcasting criminals to pitying and reclaiming them, Garland suggests that the most decisive changes in this direction occurred between 1895 and 1914 (see also Forsythe 1991). In England, as in most Western nations, in 1930 one could look back on a century of falling crime, of rising optimism about reintegrating criminals and the criminal classes, and on dramatic reductions in the brutality of the criminal justice system. Stigmatic and outcasting forms of punishment such as flogging and transportation had disappeared and capital punishment had all but disappeared. The imprisonment rate per 100,000 population was one-seventh of its level of 100 years earlier (Ramsay 1982).

I will move on now to discuss how the Victorian era may have laid the foundations not only for a triumph of shame, but also perhaps for a triumph of the policy of integration over the policy of casting out. Those developments continued in the Edwardian period, but were sharply reversed later in the twentieth century, when shame was for the most part excised from our vocabulary (Scheff 1988; Lynd 1958), when the steadily growing influence of the rehabilitative ideal was halted and then reversed as we set about building and filling coercive prisons again. The classicism which preceded late Victorian optimism about the reclaimability of criminals was revived in a neo-classical penology—retribution or 'just deserts' was back.

The broad historical pattern seems consistent with the theory of reintegrative shaming. For several centuries prior to the nineteenth century, the West relied on social control that was brutally punitive. The punishment was public and coupled with

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2 See also Foucault's (1977: 260-3) account of the later demise of the chain gang in the same terms. Chain gangs would sing songs celebrating their deviance; their trudging journeys through the streets of the city were ceremonies no longer of shame but of defiance. So they came to be transported in enclosed carriages.

3 Indeed, in the record of micro-encounters of seventeenth-century punishment as well, one can find evidence for the stigmatization hypothesis. In 1683 as Gillis Nicas left an Amsterdam scaffold after being whipped and branded, he loudly exclaimed: 'Of course I won't be good now, but will do wrong a hundred times more' (Spierenburg 1984: 64). For verbalizing this truth, the magistrates had him whipped again.
shame, but the shame was highly stigmatic—humiliating, degrading, and outcasting (Beattie 1984; Spierenburg 1984). Under this punitive-stigmatic system, the level of violence in society was much higher than today (Gurr 1980, 1984; Beattie 1984; Stone 1977: 93–102). During the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the system became less punitive and the shaming more reintegrative—and crime rates fell sharply (Braithwaite 1989: 111–14). But by the late twentieth century we had seen both a general weakening of shaming and some shift with neo-classicism back to stigmatic and away from reintegrative shaming; and from the 1960s onwards, crime rates rose again (Braithwaite 1989: 49).

In the 1920s one might have looked back on the Victorian period as an ongoing contest between two visions of how to deal with the dangerous classes: reclaim them, or discipline and segregate them (clear them out of slums that are intolerably close to respectable areas). And perhaps the integrative vision finally got the upper hand. Stedman Jones has described this battle between the policies of integrating and outcasting:

Historians have generally discussed this question in a rather one-sided and teleological manner. Looking forward to the creation of the welfare state, they have concentrated upon proposals for old-age pensions, free education, free school meals, subsidized housing, and national insurance. They have virtually ignored parallel proposals to segregate the casual poor, to establish detention centres for 'loafers', to separate pauper children from 'degenerate' parents or to ship the 'residuum' overseas. Yet, for contemporaries, both sort of proposals composed parts of a single debate. (Stedman Jones 1984: 313–14)

The Victorian era might be conceived as one when the policies of outcasting were gradually replaced by integrative policies, first in the form of private charities which attempted to make the poor reputable and deserving through the supervision of 'lady rent collectors' and others, and finally by the integrative ideology of the embryonic welfare state. Concomitantly, criminal justice policies became more humane and integrative.

At the micro level of the family we can see the culmination of a reintegrative shift even more clearly than at the macro level. Stearns and Stearns (1986: 241) see the predominant norms of child-rearing in the seventeenth century as will-breaking techniques and the indulgence of anger by parents. By the Victorian period this had changed dramatically (Thompson 1988: 127–8, 134). Children were now to be viewed as objects of loving tenderness; anger and violence in family relations became matters for shame. 'Family manuals began to include specific injunctions against anger, as part of a larger emphasis on affection and on the mutuality of obligations among family members' (Stearns and Stearns 1986: 29). Lawrence Stone, in his monumental study, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800*, concludes that it is wrong to see a unilinear historical shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* during the period he examines (Stone 1977: 660). This is because between 1500 and 1800 the family became in important ways less of a *Gesellschaft* institution with an impersonal contractual, coercive

4 'The Elizabethan village was a place filled with malice and hatred, its only unifying bond being the occasional episode of mass hysteria, which temporarily bound together the majority in order to harry and persecute the local witch' (Stone 1977: 98).
quality to its ordering and more of a *Gemeinschaft* institution, closely knit by bonds of love.

This creation of a family where social control is based on what, in my theoretical terms, would be called reintegrative shaming is well documented from records of upper-class family life. However, it is not so clear what was happening within working-class families. Also, there were clear gender differences in upper-class families, with daughters being socialized to unconditional control of anger to secure family harmony, while boys were taught to channel their anger, restraining it to outside those channels: ‘According to the founder of the [US] National Congress of Mothers, while girls should be trained to prepare a tranquil home and face problems cheerfully, boys should simply be trained in righteous indignation’ (Stearns and Stearns 1986: 76). Women, both privately in their family roles (Howe 1976) and publicly through their roles in the caring professions (particularly social work), were in the vanguard of shifts towards reintegrative modalities of social control.

Critics who say that the notion of reintegrative shaming is one that could only work in pre-industrial-revolution villages therefore miss an important point. More families in the twentieth-century city exhibit loving socialization practices based on the socially integrative fostering of pride in doing right and shame at doing wrong, compared with seventeenth-century life where families relied more on will-breaking techniques and violent punishment (Beattie 1984: 41–3; Stone 1977: 6–7). Here it is critical to remember that the theory posits that shaming will be most powerful within proximate groups (particularly families) where the conditions of communitarianism are maximally satisfied, where interdependency is so strong that family members care deeply about approval and disapproval. Hence it could be that while the capacity of the local church congregation to shame effectively has declined since the seventeenth century, the capacity of families to do so has increased (even after allowing for the possibility of some postwar slippage in this capacity). Yet even this interpretation must be treated with some scepticism. Though churches shame less than they used to in the pre-industrial village, progressively since the Inquisition the church has taken the teachings of Christ more seriously and shamed less stigmatically and more reintegratively.

Garland (1985) sees Victorian social policy as oriented towards integrating the deserving poor into the mainstream of British life, while Victorian prisons were institutions which segregated the undeserving poor, separating the disreputable from the respectable working class. The 1834 Poor Law Report was clear that there was a ‘small disreputable minority, whose resentment was not to be feared, and whose favour was of no value’ (Checkland 1974: 216; see also Foucault 1971). But this moral divide was increasingly contested, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as prison reformers argued that the goal of social policy should always be to reclaim, to rehabilitate even the most disreputable.

But if policies of reintegrative shaming did get the upper hand by the end of the Victorian era through the rise of institutions like the Sunday School, the loving family, and the profession of social work (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985: 432; Thompson 1988), they did not keep it. While clear legacies of them exist today in welfare state policies, community corrections, and community policing, exclusionary and stigmatic criminal justice policies have staged a comeback. There has been a shift from moralizing to punitive social control, at least in social control directed against working-class criminals: when business regulatory agencies deal with white-collar criminals, their
preferred strategy continues to be social control by moral suasion (Hawkins 1983; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986). Nevertheless, the point remains that there has been neither a continuous historical decline nor a continuously rising ascendancy of shaming. There were the trends Elias identified of shifts within and between the nobility and the bourgeoisie from control mediated by physical coercion to control mediated by shaming; but Elias was inattentive to the fact that at the same time control of the lower classes by shame collapsed as physical coercion escalated. Yet in the century to the depression of 1930 there were important integrative changes as the upper classes became more dependent on and afraid of the working classes. The ‘reputable’ working class was certainly integrated into the mainstream of Victorian propriety. And it became more acceptable to argue that even the disreputable poor should be subject to inclusionary rather than exclusionary social control. Certainly the welfare state has left us with a working class which is no longer a ‘dangerous’ outcast class from polite society. The emergent interdependency discussed by Elias among the upper classes has been somewhat extended to the lower classes. And it is reasonable to posit that when relationships between two classes shift from stigmatization to interdependency, inter-class shaming is more likely to be heeded.

It is just that as these changes occurred we began to lose faith and interest in shaming and dialogue as methods of social control, and our enthusiasm for economicist and coercive social control rekindled. Shame was declassé within the increasingly popular libertarian vision of the citizen freely choosing in a market for commodities where punishment was just another commodity. It became a tolerated idea that we have a right to break the law so long as we pay the price in punishment. While the coercion of the ancien régime was coupled with shame, modern coercion is uncoupled from shame to a considerable degree (Braithwaite 1989: 59–61). So the potentialities of shame for good and ill are less exploited.

Interdependency in a Complex Urban Society

In Crime, Shame and Reintegration I argue that shaming affects us most when we are shamed by people who matter to us. It follows that people enmeshed in many interdependent relationships with others are exposed to more sources of effective shaming. Contrary to the common view, there has been no unilinear movement away from interdependency across the past millenium. Trevelyan (1985: 317) makes this comment about life in seventeenth-century England:

Men and women were widely scattered through the island, thrown back upon themselves during frequent hours of solitude and isolation; each had space to grow, like the spreading oak tree alone in the field, without troubling too much to conform to any conventional pattern. It was ‘every man in his humour’. The typical economic life of the time, as conducted by yeoman, farmer, and small craftsman, left the individual more unfettered and self-dependent than he had been in the corporate life of medieval burgher and serf, or has become in our own day under great capitalist and labour combinations.

The contention is often made that in a complex urban society citizens are isolated, while in a village they were traditionally enmeshed in powerful interdependencies. This is both true and false. At the level of geographical neighbourhood it is true. In the village we are much more vulnerable to shame by our neighbours than in the city.
However, in terms of their total sets of interdependencies twentieth-century city-dwellers have many more interdependencies than fifteenth-century villagers for the reasons outlined by Elias, even if they have fewer interdependencies than nineteenth-century city-dwellers. The contemporary city-dweller may have a set of colleagues at work, in her trade union, among members of his golf club, among drinking associates whom he meets at the same pub, among members of a professional association, the parents and citizens' committee for her daughter's school, not to mention a geographically extended family, where many of these significant others can mobilize potent disapproval. There are actually more interdependencies in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century city; it is just that they are not geographically segregated within a community. If I think of my own place in the division of labour, it becomes clear that some of the actors in the best position to shame me are professional colleagues who live as far away from me on this planet as it is possible to live. I care more about the approval of Gilbert Geis than I care about the approval of my nextdoor neighbour. No matter how exotic my interests are, in the city those interests can become a basis for constructing communities. Moreover, many of the new interdependencies that started as privileges of the wealthy have spread throughout the class structure. Most importantly, the school progressively expanded from being a set of interdependencies reserved for a select group of ruling-class families to universality. Sporting clubs, once solely the preserve of the rich, today have large numbers of working-class members.

One of the mythologies of late modernity is that capitalism runs on formal controls to the exclusion of the informal. The fact is that at the very centre of capitalism what you have on Wall Street, in Tokyo, and in the City of London is a surprisingly communitarian culture of capital. This is illustrated in Burrough and Helyar's (1991) rich ethnography of the greatest takeover of them all—the battle for RJR Nabisco. The following passage shows, through the agency of Henry Kravis, the investment banker who won the takeover battle, the importance of ceremonies of reintegration in the Wall Street investment community:

Wall Street is a small place, and in the interests of harmony Kravis wasted no time healing wounds inflicted during the fight. He made peace with Peter Cohen at a summit in February and actually hired Tom Hill to investigate the possible takeover of Northwest Airlines. . . . Kravis also moved to smooth relations with Linda Robinson. Soon after the Gerstner episode, Linda took a message that Kravis had called. She ignored it. Within days she received a small ceramic doghouse with a cute note from Kravis, suggesting he was in the Robinsons' doghouse. Linda Robinson waited a few days, then sent Kravis a twenty-pound bag of dog food. All was forgiven. She and Kravis still own 'Trillion'.

Fees, of course, went infinitely further toward soothing Wall Street's wounds . . . Kravis even spread the largesse to those whose feelings he might have bruised. Geoff Boisi's Goldman Sachs got the job of auctioning Del Monte, while Felix Rohatyn's Lazard Freres did the same for the company's stake in ESPN. (Burrough and Helyar 1991: 508)

These may be vulgar modalities of reintegration; yet they are practical means of nurturing vulgar communities. A standard observation in the business culture literature is that the City of London is much more communitarian than New York (e.g. . . .

5 Moreover, this concern to enjoy approval and avoid disapproval seems to prevent crime. In criminology we do not seem to have a major problem of scholars seeking rapid career advancement by fraudulently fabricating data, a problem at least one other discipline has in a very serious way (Braithwaite 1984: ch. 3).
Wechsberg 1966: 41; Coleman 1990: 109). Indeed, a large part of the theme of Michael Clarke's (1986) classic work on the City is that a shift to more formal regulatory control was needed there because Wall Street cowboys and dirty diggers did not quite understand that they were being allowed into a gentlemen's club 'where a word is as good as a contract'.

Admittedly, it is easier to cut oneself off from disapproval by some of these non-geographical communities of modernity (by simply withdrawing from them) than it is to cut oneself off from the disapproval of fellow villagers. But the reverse is also sometimes true. One cannot withdraw from the disapproval of one's international professional community by moving house; to do that one must learn a new career.

Modern communications interact with the division of labour to expand our interdependencies further. Business deals that decades ago were done by correspondence are today negotiated face to face; air travel means that business is transacted with an intimacy and exposure to interpersonal reproach that were once not possible.Communications are also important to explaining how exotic interest-based communities that could not exist in the past are created in the modern city. If my consuming recreational interest is in breeding blue canaries, there is a chance in a large city with an efficient transport system that I will form interdependencies that will be very important to me within an association of canary breeders.

There are actually various sides to the effect on shame of this proliferation of roles. On the one hand, as Duerr (1988a: 10) points out, in pre-modern societies, because people were confronted with the whole person rather than (as today) fragments of the personality, the consequences of a blackened reputation could be total. It should be noted, however, that this point has maximum force with respect to the costs of stigmatization. It has less force concerning the power of reintegrative shaming, which means, by definition, that a person's whole self is accepted as good; it is just a part of their conduct which is disapproved as bad. For those of us who believe that stigmatization tends to be counterproductive, it is not a very telling point that the consequences of stigmatization are more terrible in the village than in the city. On the other hand, it is a telling point that stigmatization will be less likely in the village because the understanding villagers have of the complex totality of their neighbours renders them less susceptible to the stereotypical outcasting of deviants that is normal in the metropolis (Braithwaite 1989: 88). Finally, it strikes me as a rather open empirical question whether reintegrative shaming by a single group on which we depend for everything will be more or less powerful than reintegrative shaming by many groups on each of which we depend for some important subset of our needs.

Today's enormous proliferation of roles in fact makes us vulnerable to shame in a way that is peculiar to a world of such role proliferation. We all experience the minor embarrassment of coming into contact with others who know us in different roles—the former Sunday School teacher from whom we purchase condoms in a pharmacy, the appointment with a doctor married to a colleague at work, the inhibition we feel at enjoying an intimate meal with our spouse in a restaurant when some of our students are seated at the adjoining table. Goffman (1956) has explained how we minimize these minor embarrassments by strategies to match audience segregation to role segregation. The result is that 'those before whom he plays out one of his roles will not be the

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6 I am grateful to Mike Miller for this point.
individuals before whom he plays out another, allowing him to be a different person in each role without discrediting the other' (Goffman 1956: 269).

However, Benson (1989) showed through his interviews with convicted white-collar criminals that one of the consequences of a criminal conviction is that audience segregation cannot be sustained. The worst side of the offender's business or professional self is exposed to people to whom he normally presents his churchgoing self, his golf-playing self, his fatherly self. Precisely because we make ourselves comfortable in a role-segregated world by partitioning audiences in a way that enables us to present radically different selves to those different audiences, our shame can be many-sided and more unmanageable in a role-segregated world. In the village society, there is limited segregation of audiences. Our neighbours will have seen most of the sides to our personality. When the worst of one side of that personality is exposed, it is not such a shock. The segmented self is therefore a double-edged sword. It affords us day-to-day protection from shame as we move around groups with different values; but it leaves us very vulnerable when an act of wrongdoing becomes so public as to become known to all these groups. The latter vulnerability has maximum force with the shaming of crime, because this is the most public institutionalization of shaming that we have.

To understand how shame can be either more or less powerful in a complex industrialized society, we must understand the implications of this role segregation. Shaming can be the more powerful, as we have seen, when we care about how our actions in one of our roles will be thought of by those who know us in other roles. But shaming will be less powerful when we immerse ourselves in one role, cutting ourselves off from caring about how we are viewed through the lenses of other role relationships. And there is an important standard way in which this cutting off occurs. It is stigmatization.

Assume I am a used car dealer and used car dealing is what matters to me more than anything else. If I am stigmatized as shady in my church, my club, and my extended family simply because I am a used car dealer, then I may cope with this by cutting myself off from those interdependencies. I may retreat into a stigmatized subculture of used car dealers. If I am a young black gang member who is stigmatized in all my other relationships as a gang member, I am likely to cut myself off from those relationships. In fact I may do more than cut myself off from caring about what my teachers and family think of me; out of resentment at the way they stigmatize me, I may seek to do exactly the opposite to that which they would approve. In short, stigmatization not only cuts away the heightened exposure to shame we have in a structurally differentiated world, it can create criminal subcultures where shame resides in complying with the law. I have argued the importance of stigmatization in fostering criminal subculture formation at greater length in *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*. Here I wish only to make the point that there is no structural inevitability about the impotence of shaming in an urbanized industrial society. Tokyo is testimony to that. And so are Japanese, Chinese, and Jewish communities within the most violent of American cities. Even in New York City the best protection that citizens get is not from the police but from loving families who dispense disapproval effectively. There is no inexorable historical march with modernization towards a society where shaming works less well. As a society becomes more role-differentiated, the potential for effective shaming increases in important ways, but so does the potential for stigmatization that cuts off effective shaming. In the industrial city, there is more potential than in the village for
subcultures isolated from and opposed to the cultural mainstream to be sustained. This, needless to say, is a source of good, vital, and creative things that come of urban life, as well as brutal, destructive, and exploitative things.

But a community that gives up on shaming cannot make the political choice to mobilize against the brutal and exploitative. It also relinquishes its capacity to restrain those who would trample the rights of citizens who wish to be deviant in ways that do no harm to others (Braithwaite forthcoming). In a community where there is no pride in respecting the rights of others, no shame in trampling on the rights of others, rights will afford protection only on those extremely rare occasions when rich people assert them in the courts. This, at least, is the contention of Crime, Shame and Reintegration.

Conclusion

Before the seventeenth century, before the time when an embryonic parliamentary democracy such as England could become a major power, the view across the globe was that despotism was the key to efficiency and economic might. ‘Freedom was a luxury to be enjoyed by small communities like the Cantons of Switzerland and the Seven Provinces of Holland’ (Trevelyan 1985: 72). In the twentieth century we suffer from a similar simple-minded view with regard to informal social control. Many politicians believe that informal control is a luxury only small communities can deploy to secure the dominion of their citizens. In large industrialized nations, there is no choice but to give up on communitarianism and sacrifice our freedom to a strong centralized system of formal social control.

The objective of this article has been no more than to dispute this pessimism about the role of community in contemporary mass societies. We actually know very little about the history of shame in the West, let alone elsewhere. However, we do know enough to reject the proposition of a unidirectional trend away from the efficacy of shame as societies modernize. And we know that some of the most important types of criminal offending are more shameful today than they were in earlier, even recent, historical periods. We rightly lament the contemporary shamelessness of corporate environmental criminals and of men who assault their wives. And we rightly identify these crimes as having deep structural and cultural roots in exploitive and patriarchal ideologies. But we know that business executives are more vulnerable to shame for environmental crimes today than they were just twenty-five years ago, before the rise of the environmental movement (McAllister 1991). And we know that, limited as the power of feminist shaming has been, the following description of the shamelessness of male violence in fifteenth-century England could not be regarded as an accurate description of the contemporary situation (see also Beattie 1984: 41–3): ‘Wife-beating was a recognised right of man, and was practised without shame by high as well as low. Similarly, the daughter who refused to marry the gentleman of her parents’ choice was liable to be locked up, beaten, and flung about the room, without any shock being inflicted upon public opinion’ (Trevelyan 1985: 196). Whether beating of wives and daughters is more or less common today is hard to say. But we can say that such beatings attract more shame. A ducking-stool for the disciplining of nagging wives could not be installed in an English town in 1992. Because this would be shameful in the late twentieth century, brutal men discipline their wives secretly, away from the disapproving gaze of others.
It is no simple matter to prescribe the political struggle for an urban republic in which public disapproval penetrates the private domains of those who do violence to other human beings, without also destroying privacy rights. But it would be a tragedy if we were dissuaded from such a struggle by the view that social disapproval was something we left behind on the farm.

References


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