Rick Kuhn
from Monthly Review 50 (6) November 1998 pp. 30-44
It wasn't the usual forest fires or cuddly marsupials that put Australia briefly into the news around the world in mid 1998. Two events, unlike the bushfires or koala capers, illustrated the increasing tensions in Australian politics.
On Saturday June 13, the racist One Nation Party received almost a quarter of the votes in the Queensland State elections and entered the State Parliament for the first time. The Party was less than two years old, but polled better than any 'minor' party in the whole post-war period. One Nation's success shifted the spectrum in electoral politics sharply to the right. The dominant political forces in Australia, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) but especially the conservative Coalition of the Liberal and rurally based National Parties were very worried. But their relief when One Nation's momentum dropped in the October 3 federal elections may be misplaced. The conditions that gave rise to the Party and its Queensland success not only remain, but will deepen as the Australian economy moves into recession.
During the Queensland election campaign, the endgame of the 'war on the waterfront', the largest industrial confrontation since the late 1960s was being played out. It began when hundreds of private security guards wearing balaclavas and accompanied by savage dogs took over Patrick Stevedores' port facilities across Australia. They rounded up the wharfies (longshoremen) and expelled them from the docks. The entire Patrick waterfront workforce of 2100, all unionists, was sacked. This successful, military-style operation was supposed to be the masterstroke in the conservative Australian Government's campaign to undermine the union movement. But mass picketing, widespread support for the wharfies and the threat of escalating industrial conflict influenced a court decision to reinstate the sacked workers.
The Hanson phenomenon and the war on the waterfront are both expressions of rising class contradictions in Australia. Both were responses to the Australian experience of global economic crisis since the mid 1970s and neo-liberal economic policies. And the preconditions for both matured but were, temporarily, papered over by the Hawke and Keating ALP governments between 1983 and 1996. Tensions escalated and burst into the open after the conservative Coalition Government of John Howard took office in 1996.
Shortly before the March 1996 federal elections, the Liberal Party disendorsed its candidate for a safe Labor Party seat in Queensland. Pauline Hanson had made a series of racist statements against Aborigines (Australia's indigenous population) and Asians. The election saw a massive setback for the ALP and ended its record 'long decade' in office.
In Government, the Coalition's first priority was to stir up racist sentiment. The new Ministers mounted a sustained campaign against the so-called 'Aboriginal industry', policies and organizations which acknowledged the oppression of indigenous Australians.
On all significant measures of well-being, Aborigines are at the bottom of the heap.
Their lives are 15-20 years shorter than other Australians. They are sicker, though low
levels of public health spending on Aborigines doesn't reflect this. While a third of
Aborigines complete secondary schooling, the national average is over three quarters.
About eight per cent of the whole Australian labour force is unemployed, around a quarter
of Aborigines are. Aborigines are 15 times more likely to be caught up in the criminal
justice system, including jails, than the rest of population.
There were two related motives behind the Government's racist campaign. The first was to prepare for new legislation on Aboriginal landrights. The second involved a political strategy.
The violent expropriation of the continent by Europeans since 1788, has been consistently challenged by Aboriginal groups and organizations. From the 1960s Aboriginal campaigns for land, supported by sections of the labor movement and especially its socialist left wing, prompted some legislative concessions from federal and a few State governments. The landrights situation changed when the High Court (Australia's constitutional and highest appeal court) brought down its decision on the Murray Islanders or Mabo case, in 1992. This overturned the whole legal basis for the dispossession of Aboriginal people. But the Keating ALP Government legislated, in 1993, to restrict the new possibilities for a minority of Aboriginal groups to establish 'native title' claims, by narrowing the implications of the High Court decision. The Government was worried about the decision's economic and electoral implications, as landrights gave Aboriginal people greater scope to influence mining and pastoral developments.
In 1996, the High Court ruled in the Wik case that, despite the Mabo legislation, native title could still co-exist with pastoral leases.
The peak rural industry lobby, the National Farmers' Federation (NFF), and the Coalition Parties, especially the Nationals, ran scare campaigns against the Mabo and Wik decisions. They denounced the ALP's legislation as too weak. With no regard for the truth, they asserted that no one was safe; that Aborigines could lay claim to anyone's back yard. The new Coalition Government's efforts to whip up anti-Aboriginal racism were therefore a continuation of a campaign that had been going on for four years.
Landrights was also a convenient hook on which to hang a 'wedge' strategy drawn from
the Republican Party in the USA. The issue helped shift the lines of political cleavage
from class to race.
The landslide defeat of the ALP in 1996 tumbled Pauline Hanson into the House of Representatives as an independent. She was well aware that she had galvanised support on the basis of hostility to the Labor Party's economic rationalism (the Australia term for neo-liberalism) and her racism. These issues have been her stocks in trade ever since. Her maiden speech was the most racist tirade heard in Parliament for decades. But it drew on a long and entrenched tradition going back to the European invasion, genocidal policies against Aborigines which continued until recently, colonial anti-Chinese legislation and the 'white Australia policy' that governed immigration from Federation in 1901 to the 1970s.
Hanson blamed economic and social problems on racial minorities and big business. She denounced a 'reverse racism' that supposedly dominates public policy and favours Aborigines over 'mainstream Australians'. She appealed to prejudices about Asians, who 'have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate'. Australia, she said, is 'in danger of being swamped by Asians'. Hanson also drew attention to the consequences of unemployment and called on the Government to 'stop kowtowing to financial markets, international organizations, world bankers, investment companies and big business people.'
Although the Liberal Party had expelled her, Howard defended Hanson. He gave credibility to the argument that she, far from being a vicious racist, was a victim of 'political correctness'. Other conservatives and some business figures were more critical. Their main argument was that Hanson's anti Asian stance damaged trade. For two and a half years, Howard maintained that the best way to deal with Hanson was to ignore her.
Nor did Hanson have to reinvent racist paranoia about immigration. Both the ALP and the conservative parties had contributed to a racist moral panic about Vietnamese 'boat people' in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1980s, the Labor Party Government built a concentration camp in remote north-western Australia to accommodate Asian asylum seekers while their cases were being assessed.
Hanson has insisted on zero net immigration and that migrants are parasitic. But, in office, the ALP and the conservatives cut immigration quotas and implemented waiting periods before migrants could use social services.
In April 1997 Hanson established own national organization, 'Pauline Hanson's One
Nation Party'. She has been the organization's key human asset. Her image, often literally
wrapped in the Australian flag, is central to One Nation's advertising. She and some
supporters wrote a book, whose most notorious and bizarre claim was that Aborigines were
cannibals and even ate their own children.
With the support of the leadership of the union movement, the Labor Party governments
after 1983 had introduced a series of neo-liberal reforms.
Reforms of government departments and authorities led to the 'rationalization' of services. This hit rural areas particularly hard as offices were closed down in many country towns, where deregulated banks often shut branches too. Smaller rural producers in were particularly affected by the progressive removal of measures which guaranteed the domestic market to local goods.
The Labor Party acted on free-trade rhetoric much more decisively than the previous conservative government. But there were advantages to being in opposition. Tom O'Lincoln has pointed out how the hard hit non-urban petty bourgeoisie could nurture hopes that when 'their' Party, the Nationals, were back in government things would be better. The NFF encouraged illusions in the Coalition. Rural capital, which produces a disproportionate share of farm output, is the main influence in the NFF, although most farms are relatively small, family run operations.
The crunch came after the Coalition won the 1996 election. The conservatives continued the process of neo-liberal reform and exposing the rural sector to competition, notably by opening up the domestic market to imported sugar. During the Queensland election campaign, a significant issue in some electorates was pork imports from Canada. The elimination of tens of thousands of public service jobs during the Coalition's first year in office, part privatization of Telstra (the publicly owned telecommunications corporation) and the privatization of the Commonwealth Employment Service resulted in more branch closures in country towns. Nor, of course, was the Coalition able to wave a magic wand to improve international prices of rural commodities.
One Nation's organising drive was most successful in rural areas 'the bush' and, to some extent, on the outskirts of large urban centres. There is, however, a great deal of potential for One Nation in Australia's cities. They have a vastly larger population than the bush, many more petty bourgeois suffering economic problems and a large pool of unorganised and unemployed workers. But, from the start, One Nation's public meetings in larger cities were met with big, noisy and sometimes militant demonstrations. Although often initiated by small socialist groups, these rallies and pickets attracted a wide layer of people from the union movement, migrant and Aboriginal communities and the ALP. The protests have been extremely effective in intimidating people with vaguely racist ideas and unsystematic sympathies for Hanson from attending One Nation gatherings. By late 1997, Hanson's star seemed to be on the wain.
Thanks to the anti-racist movement, therefore, One Nation's successes have been confined to country areas, where racism is strong, the union movement is weaker, there is no socialist presence and, in parts of New South Wales and Queensland, the outright fascist and anti-semitic League of Rights has had a small base for decades.
Let down by the Coalition and relatively unopposed by anti-racist activists on the
ground, many National Party supporters (and some former Liberal and ALP voters) turned to
One Nation. The new party appealed to fears of unemployment and bankruptcy as well as
racist traditions, which have been relegitimised by Howard. But the conservatives'
concerns about exports meant that they were far less consistent racists than Hanson: 'the
race card [was] trumped by One Nation'.
The economic goals and policies of One Nation are extremely simple. There are three components: opposition to foreign ownership, support for the restoration of tariff barriers and calls for low interest loans to small business, a standard right wing populist and fascist panacea. The policies certainly can't solve Australia's economic problems. A serious attempt to implement them would lower living standards and create illusions of common interests between bosses and workers.
Hanson has voiced support for unionism … as a barrier to 'Asianization'. But she backed the Coalition's new, anti-union industrial relations legislation and its efforts to exclude small business from unfair dismissal laws.
In April and May 1998 national attention was focussed on efforts to smash the wharfies and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and, so the NFF and Government argued, dramatically improve the lot of Australians in rural areas. Hanson had nothing notable to say about the waterfront dispute. Her racism points away from class struggle as an effective response to economic rationalism.
One Nation's spectacular successes in Queensland came just as the efforts to scapegoat the wharfies for Australia's economic problems were ending in a humiliating defeat for Patrick and the Government. But the union movement, weakened by years of collaboration with Labor Party Governments, and still less the ALP itself were not in a position to constitute an alternative pole of attraction for right wing sections of the rural population alienated from the Coalition. One Nation's right wing populism, on the other hand, succeeded in pulling this section of the conservative electorate further to the right. Hence the Queensland election result, a tremendous spring board for Hanson's national aspirations. The rise of One Nation is shaping up to be the biggest shake up of the Australian party system since the 1950s.
The Coalition's capitalist backers and the financial press are worried about the
hostility to economic rationalism One Nation has tapped. When the economics editor of
Australia's financial newspaper argued the 'Folly of appeasing Hanson', he didn't mean her
racist policies.
One Nation did not sustain the level of electoral support apparent in the Queensland elections in the federal poll, even in that State, and failed to gain a single seat in the House of Representatives. But with more than eight per cent of the vote, the Party confirmed its national influence and, thanks to its 14.5 per cent support in Queensland, won a seat in the Senate. One Nation preferences also helped the Coalition achieve its narrow victory. The Party may now decline and could even fly apart. It is still unstable and plagued by personal bickering and political tensions amongst the disillusioned conservatives, populists, fascists and plain opportunists who are leaders at different levels. But One Nation has given a right wing cadre some experience of organising and mass work. Hanson has demonstrated the potential for racist populism in Australia and, as the Government continues with 'economic reform' and the local economy experiences the world recession, the opportunities for these politics will expand.
The assault on the wharfies would have been inconceivable without changes in industrial relations under the Labor Party governments before 1996. In 1982, fifty per cent of workers were members of trade unions. The union movement's industrial strength and a much broader popular acceptance of the role of unions in Australia than the USA, meant that significant wage cutting and economic reform could only take place with the support of union leaders. The ALP came to office in 1983, at the bottom of a recession, promising to 'maintain wages over time' and to overcome unemployment. The centre piece of these governments' approach to industrial relations and strategy for economic management was an incomes policy embodied in an agreement with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU, the equivalent of the AFL-CIO), called the Prices and Incomes Accord or just 'the Accord'. Under this arrangement wage fixing became highly centralised. Union leaders delivered wage restraint and industrial peace in return for an increase in their own say in public policy. Union officials were represented on a large number of statutory and consultative bodies.
The consequences of these reforms for workers were less than impressive. Centralised wages bargaining undermined shop floor organization and the union movement's capacity to mobilise. Unions which opposed the strategy were coerced into line or, in the case of the industrially militant Builders Labourers' Federation, destroyed by joint action of governments, the ACTU and other unions. In 1989-90, with tacit ACTU support, the ALP federal Government used the Air Force to guarantee the defeat of a strike over wages by airline pilots.
Real wages fell under the ALP during the 1980s: the first time that this had occurred in the recovery stage of the business cycle in Australia. Then, from the late 1980s, the ACTU went along with a radical decentralization of wage negotiations, in the form of 'Enterprise Bargaining', which undermined the union movement's capacity to conduct industry wide campaigns.
Nor did the ALP deliver on its promises to overcome unemployment. The pattern of unemployment in Australia over the past decade and a half has not been much different from other developed countries. During the recovery of the mid 1990s, it was around eight per cent, higher than the level during the recovery of the mid 1980s.
By 1996 the proportion of unionists in the workforce was only 35 per cent and the absolute number of union members had also fallen. Rank and file morale and organization had withered. To employers and the Coalition, the way seemed open for an effective strategy of undermining working class organization through sharp confrontation rather than cooptation.
Prime Minister John Howard wanted a historic shift in relations between capital and labor, like Ronald Reagan's destruction of PATCO in 1981 or Margaret Thatcher's victory over the Miners Union in 1985. In the 1996 election campaign, Howard promised that a new conservative government would encourage closer, trusting relations between employers and their employees, by making it possible for them to communicate directly, without the interference of 'third parties', and that no workers would be worse off. The troublesome 'third parties' were, of course, trade unions. The Coalition parties, the NFF and stevedoring companies had been complaining about the wharfies for years. The conservatives' industrial relations statements before and after the election specifically attacked the MUA, as a symbol of the whole union movement.
The Howard Government's legislative means to harmony between employers and employees, the Workplace Relations Act (WRA), came into effect at the end of 1996. Both the Coalition and employers thought this would be a decisive weapon against organized workers, pay and conditions. The Act dramatically reduced the role of the Industrial Relations Commission and the system of awards (legally enforcible decisions) over which it presided. Labor's industrial relations reform had already made non-union collective agreements possible. Procedures for implementing these as well as individual contracts between bosses and workers were now simplified.
The Coalition Government continued to focus particularly on the wharfies, a tough and therefore important target. From the mid 1930s, under the leadership of Communists, they had rebuilt their union and developed strong traditions of branch and workplace democracy and of political engagement. Thanks to their industrial militancy, the wharfies achieved dramatic improvements in job security and pay. The 'bull system', where wharfies were picked up for work by foremen on a daily or twice daily basis, was abolished during World War II. Waterside workers imposed a closed union shop in many ports, including the largest. Today they are amongst the best paid semi-skilled workers in the country. Their record of solidarity dates back to the 1930s. Wharfies took industrial action against the Japanese occupation of China in 1938, Dutch efforts to reconquer Indonesia in the late 1940s and Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War.They also provided funds for the Aboriginal movement and banned the export of enriched uranium ore in the 1970s. So, on both political and economic grounds, employers and the Government were keen to break the wharfies and their union.
During 1997, the Government and Patrick management began to conspire over practical plans to smash the MUA. A successful operation would demoralise the whole union movement.
The campaign against the wharfies was particularly popular in rural areas. The Government and NFF maintained that, if only ports were more efficient Australia's exports would flourish and farmers' incomes improve. It is, however, a particularly tenuous chain of argument from lower costs in moving containers (as opposed to bulk handling) to lower charges to freight operators, to higher prices for wholesalers to better prices for farmers. Breaking the MUA would undoubtedly increase profits. But the main beneficiaries would be the stevedoring, freight, shipping companies and agribusiness, rather than small rural producers.
The Government encouraged a series of attempts to undermine the MUA.
In September 1997, International Purveyors locked out its unionised workforce in the small port of Cairns in north Queensland. The Government applauded. But, when the London-based International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) threatened to boycott the company around the world, it backed off.
Patrick Stevedores funded a covert attempt to train scab wharfies -- in Dubai -- in December 1997. A contractor made special efforts to recruit current and former Special Air Services commandos for this adventure. International solidarity again delivered an important victory. The ITF threatened a global boycott of ships using United Arab Emirates ports. This scab training operation was quickly terminated.
Then, in late January 1998, Patrick management excluded unionists from its Webb Dock facilities so scabs could be trained there. When they were deemed ready, on April 7, the assault on the MUA began. The entire Patrick labor force on the waterfront was sacked.
The Union set up mass pickets of Patrick docks across the country immediately. The wharfies were joined by workers from other industries. For example, the Australian Capital Territory Trades and Labor Council and branch of the large Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union bussed unionists from landlocked Canberra to the Sydney wharves, three hours drive away.
Militant and effective pickets of One Nation meetings had been all over the TV news recently. The precedent gave the wharfies' pickets credibility as a sensible response to the lockout.
Most union officials had done little to mobilise their members in struggles under the Hawke and Keating Governments. In the face of the assault on the wharfies, however, the union bureaucracy recognised that the future of unionism and their own jobs were at stake. Top officials from the ACTU and a series of larger, left wing unions issued statements, leaflets and articles, donated funds, organised collections and rallies and themselves attended the picket lines.
Workers are Labor's core constituency. They make up a much larger proportion of voters for the ALP than for other parties. They are represented, indirectly inside the Party through affiliated unions. And they are members (though a declining proportion) of the Party. So clear were the implications of the waterfront dispute that even senior Labor Party figures, including current and former State and federal leaders visited the pickets.
The most important response, however, came from rank and file unionists who saw the attempt to smash the MUA as a prelude to assaults on all organised workers. There were big rallies and demonstrations across the country. Large numbers made financial contributions to sustain the sacked wharfies and joined the picket lines.
Early on the morning of April 18, 200 police attempted to clear a path to the Melbourne waterfront through two thousand picketers. Around 8.00 am, senior police suddenly informed the picketers that they were reconsidering their position, when over thousand construction workers appeared behind them. They had marched off city sites, in response to a call from their union and the Melbourne Trades Hall Council. State Police Commissioners were getting worried. They issued a joint statement calling for a negotiated settlement to the dispute.
Meanwhile the level of support for the wharfies was increasing. When police were not on the offensive, there was sometimes a carnival atmosphere on picket lines, with concerts, rallies, fundraising and visiting delegations. On April 22, the MUA organised a solidarity breakfast on the picket line for women supporters in Melbourne. While few women work on the docks, women were prominent in the fight to defend the union.
The mobilizations in support of the wharfies were largest in Melbourne. Between 75,000 and 100,000 people struck and marched through the city centre on May 6 in solidarity with the MUA. Many militants also took time off to attend the picket lines. On returning to work, their reports found eager audiences.
Support for the picket lines and solidarity from other workers in Australia were the decisive factor in the wharfies' success. But workers in other countries played a very important role by placing pressure on the Howard Government and companies whose ships were loaded in Australia by scabs. Japanese, South African, New Guinea, Indian and US dockers' unions banned ships loaded by Patrick. In taking their action, the Papua New Guinea Maritime Workers Industrial Union and South African Transport and General Workers' Union referred to the support given to their industrial and anti-apartheid struggles by the MUA.
Unionists and other supporters of Australian wharfies protested against the attack on union rights in demonstrations outside or messages to Australian embassies in Tokyo, Wellington, London, New Delhi, Bangkok, Manila, Seoul, Singapore and Jakarta, where a then illegal union also threatened industrial action.
Eventually, with large scale police intervention, the most conservative State governments, in Queensland and Western Australia were able to break the picket lines in Brisbane and, briefly, Fremantle. But cargo continued to mount up in most ports . And more and more vessels had to stand off-shore waiting for a birth.
The MUA also took legal action against Patrick. The union argued that Patrick and Government officials, motivated by a desire to discriminate against unionists, had entered into a conspiracy and even breached the Government's tailor-made Workplace Relations Act.
Against a background of mounting industrial action and rising social conflict, a Federal Court judge ordered on April 21 that the wharfies be reinstated while the case was heard. Over the following two weeks, two further courts overturned Patrick's appeals against the ruling. The full Federal Court's decision was televised live, an unprecedented media event.
The Government/employer strategy for a sharp, hard campaign against the MUA was in tatters.
The deal which resolved the dispute on 15 June, was not a complete triumph for the wharfies. The MUA agreed to accept the Government's productivity targets, the loss of 700 jobs and the contracting out of ancillary and maintenance services. Workers performing these services would, however, remain unionised.
This was, nevertheless, an extremely important defensive victory. The most determined attack on the union movement since the 1930s had failed. Patrick and its customers had lost tens of millions of dollars.
Both the Government and Patrick management soon lost even more credibility, as their involvement in various cloak and dagger operations came out. Former scab workers complained about the raw deal they got when they were sacked The value of union membership and the risks involved in scabbing were very obvious.
The union movement had demonstrated that it was capable of defending its members, the best means of recruiting. The campaign to defend the wharfies boosted the morale of activists and militants and added conviction to arguments elsewhere that it is possible to fight and win, even against determined governments and bosses.
Pressures from capital for lower wages, speedups, reduced conditions and cuts in health, education and welfare expenditure can only continue. The polarization in Australian politics indicates that two kinds of responses are possible to the economic rationalism of the mainstream parties and to the competition and economic crisis that drive it.
The right wing populist variant, responding to symptoms and attacking scapegoats, points in the direction of fascism. Hanson's racist politics is incapable of challenging the logic of capital accumulation. The more influence her movement gains, the more her approach will threaten the destruction of the labor movement, as racist measures weaken working class solidarity, while failing to solve the economic problems of the petty bourgeoisie.
But there is an alternative to Hanson, just as there is to Le Pen in France, Haider in Austria, the BJP in India and other fascist or racist-populist movements. The campaign to defend Australian wharfies found allies in large numbers of Australian workers and amongst unionists in the shipping industry around the world. It both gained support from and inspired activists in the landrights movement and the campaign against Hanson in Australia.
Neo-liberalism and racism can be successfully challenged from below, and the workers' movement can experience its strength in struggles against attempts to subordinate jobs, wages and democratic rights to profits. The wharfies' victory did not threatened capitalism, but it provided workers with a glimpse of their potential power.
*. Rick Kuhn teaches political science at the Australian National University in Canberra. He is a labor movement activist and editor with Tom O'Lincoln of Class and Class Conflict in Australia (Melbourne: Longman, 1996). He would like to thank Jack Barbalet, John Berg, Tom Bramble, Diane Fieldes, Mary Gorman, Harry Magdoff, Tanya McConvell, and Ellen Meiksins Wood for their valuable encouragement, ideas or cricitisms in the preparation of this article. [main text]
1. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, As a matter of fact: answering the myths and misconceptions about indigenous Australians, (Canberra: ATSIC, 1998) p. 16. [main text]
2. Malcolm McGregor, ‘Howard drives in the wedge’ Australian Financial Review, (4 September 1996) p.16; Noel Pearson, ‘Wedge politics here to stay’ Australian Financial Review, (27 May 1997) p.20. [main text]
3. Pauline Hanson, The truth: on Asian immigration, the Aboriginal question, the gun debate and the future of Australia, (Ipswich, 1997) pp. 131-137. [main text]
5. For details see Rick Kuhn, ‘The Limits of Social Democratic Policy in Australia’ Capital and Class, (51 1993) pp. 15-51; and Rick Kuhn and Tom Bramble, ‘Social democracy after the long boom: economic restructuring under Australian Labor, 1983 to 1996’ The State and ‘Globalisation’: Comparative Studies of Labour and Capital in National Economies, ed., Martin Upchurch (London: Cassell, forthcoming). [main text]
6. See OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, (Paris, 1987). [main text]
7. Malcolm McGregor, ‘Revolt in the conservative heartland’ Australian Financial Review, (24 June 1998) p. 19. [main text]
8. Alan Mitchell, ‘Folly of appeasing Hansonism’ Australian Financial Review, (1 July 1998) p. 21; also ‘The people’s capitalism’ (editorial) Australian Financial Review, (16 June 1998) p. 18. [main text]
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