Simon Noble
If the assumptions underpinning the justification for the way our society is run are proved incorrect, then an alternative needs to be found. This is where Growth fetish comes in. It is a refreshing critique of a political line of thinking that has faced much criticism, but little mainstream discussion of a viable alternative. Growth fetish can be seen as yet more evidence that the politics of today is in need of a change. Hamilton talks specifically of the unbridled pursuit of economic growth and its negative effects on society. Effects so often ignored by political decision makers and mainstream economists who are unwilling to acknowledge the empirical evidence. Growth fetish is essentially a critique of neo-liberalism, and a proposal of a new ideology not constricted by any affiliation with either the left or right of politics, which if embraced, will lead to a better future for developed countries.
The underlying assumption of neo-liberal economics, or as it is know in Australia, 'economic rationalism', is that as individuals consume more, they become happier. The sum of individual's ability to consume is measured by their country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is assumed that an increasing GDP is always a good thing and should be one of the primary aims of government. Hamilton starts with an observation of the empirical evidence, something so often ignored by the mainstream economists of today, to discover if money does indeed buy happiness. Through statistical observations and comparisons from numerous international sources he concludes that beyond a certain level, approx US$10,000, rising income does not increase a person's wellbeing, and that at very high amounts, increasing income actually lowers wellbeing (Hamilton 2003: 24). He then concludes, "if growth does not improve wellbeing, many of the economic, social and political structures of advanced capitalism cannot be justified" (Hamilton 2003: 22). It then logically follows that if wellbeing is not linked directly with increasing GDP, then GDP is no longer, if it ever was, a suitable measure of a nations well being
Hamilton, seemingly aware that he cannot convince economic rationalists with empirical evidence alone, provides some theoretical reasons why GDP is not a suitable measure of a nation's wellbeing. Firstly, GDP only measures the production of goods and services that are for sale, ignoring many things that lie outside the market. At the same time, degradation of non-renewable resources is not taken into account, whilst expenditure on goods and services of a defensive nature, such as increased expenditure on home security because of a crime wave, is considered as increasing wellbeing. Hamilton proposes a new measure, the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), which attempts to include the cost and benefits of growth, by considering the depletion of non-renewable resources and the value of home and community work. Although this may appear to the more critical reader as the commodification of community activities and home-work, Hamilton agrees that this approach is not ideal, but is merely useful to challenge growth fetishism on its own terms.
After his convincing critique of neo-liberalism, Hamilton starts looking at the alternatives that have been available in Australian politics in recent history and some of the struggles against economic rationalism.
Despite their aims, it is argued by Hamilton that the social movements of the previous three to four decades have done little more than remove the barriers to a full on embrace of modern capitalism. This view is common with the Marxist perspective presented in Class and Class Conflict in Australia, where they state that 'radical' social movements have merely played a role in "reforming the system, in the interests of the system" (128). Similarly, Germaine Greer stated that the women's movement has only "…achieved equality so that they can feel alienated and exploited in the same way men do. They sought liberation but settled for equality" (cited in Hamilton 2003: 113).
Similarly, Hamilton argues that social democratic and labour parties are providing no real alternative either. They, just like the 'conservative' parties are in the grips of the growth fetish. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the social-democratic and labour parties of the west were in need of a new direction. Hamilton argues that it was not so much that they had supported the corrupt forms of socialism that was practiced in Eastern Europe and were now disreputable, but rather that any call for greater social ownership or collective provision of services was likely to be met with fierce resistance. The answer for many was the politics of the Third Way. The problem with this, argues Hamilton, is that just like neo-liberalism, the priorities of the government were still to increase the rate of economic growth through the free operation of private markets. A practice that leads to increased economic growth at the expense of things that actually do increase a nation's well being, such as increased levels of education, civil rights and job security.
One principle that Hamilton does share with modern social democratic parties is that of greater social equality. However the politics of the third way all but ignores structural reasons for inequality, and usually limit their efforts towards making a more egalitarian society by providing a progressive tax system and having limited public ownership of essential services. Hamilton agrees that these things play an important role in increasing a nation's wellbeing, as inequality is more a source of lower wellbeing than countries GDP per capita. However, he believes that progressive income taxation needs to be reinvigorated, and that the emphasis should be moved away from more economic growth and towards providing a basic income unconditionally to all citizens. An activity that could be funded by a recasting of the tax system - including taxes on luxury items, speculation, inheritance and pollution.
It is hard not to become inspired whilst reading Growth fetish. A better world seems so close, so achievable. The reader can envisage a new society in which we all embrace Eudemonism and politics actually focuses on achieving what will make us a happier society, not just a society with a higher rate of economic growth. It feels like reading a call to arms for the No Logo generation. One in which the politics of direct participation as seen in the environment movement and more recently the anti-globalisation movement, will prevail. Direct participation will pioneer the restructuring of societies and governments priorities towards a more happy and satisfied post-growth society. But then, when we reach the chapter on practical measures that when implemented could initiate the transition; we read, "Here is not the place to go into detail…" (Hamilton 2003: 218). Perhaps it is a ploy to make us buy his next book? Or perhaps he feels that the current minor political parties aren't prepared to such realignment in political thinking? Whatever the answer, it is difficult not to put the book down feeling slightly disappointed, feeling that the power to change history is in our hands, but that we are just not quite sure how to go about it.
Bibliography
Burgmann, Verity and Andrew Milner. 1996. "Intellectuals and the new social movements" in Rick Kuhn and Tom O'Lincoln (eds.) Class & Class Conflict in Australia Pearson Education, Sydney
Hamilton, Clive. 2003. Growth Fetish. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest
Klein, Naomi. 1999. No Logo: taking aim at the brand bullies. Picador, New York