On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control

John Braithwaite
Gilbert Geis

The recent surge of governmental and scholarly interest in corporate crime seems likely to end or to slow down considerably under the Reagan administration. This paper examines six propositions jointly suggesting that corporate crime represents a more feasible and significant crime control target than traditional crime. It is argued that the discredited doctrines of crime control by public disgrace, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation can be successfully applied to corporate crime. This would be particularly true if the implications of our propositions were to form the basis for alterations in criminal law and criminal procedure.

A historic date in the saga of corporate crime is February 7, 1961. On that day, a gaggle of senior executives from major corporations, including vice-presidents of General Electric and Westinghouse, were sent to prison for price fixing. The event moved a man who said his "contract [with General Electric] called for personal appearance tours" to write a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times. The letter was captioned "A GE Fan." The indignant correspondent asserted that General Electric operated according to the highest of principles—"higher I might add than some elements of government which are so bent on destroying business."

At the time of another white collar crime watershed, the "GE Fan"—Ronald Reagan of Pacific Palisades—was governor of California. His reaction to Watergate also is preserved in the Los Angeles Times:

Gov. Reagan said Tuesday the Watergate spies should not be considered criminals because they "are not criminals at heart."

Reagan conceded that the bugging of the Democratic headquarters was illegal but called "criminal" too harsh a term... "I think the tragedy of this is that men who are not criminals at heart and certainly not engaged in criminal activities committed a criminal or illegal act and now must bear the consequences," he said.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE: Research Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia. GILBERT GEIS: Professor, Program in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine.

"These are men," Reagan said, "whose lives are being very much changed by this. I doubt if any of them would even intentionally double park."

Within weeks of Reagan's election as President of the United States, his advisors were signaling a soft line on white collar crime. Evelle J. Younger, chair of Reagan's advisory group on criminal justice, made the following observation:

The emphasis on white-collar crime will continue, but most of us on the task force will want to focus attention on violent crime, crime in the streets, [in order to] make the nation safer for the law-abiding citizen.

Besides its seeming pro forma reference to white collar crime, the statement is notable for its failure to appreciate that enforcement of laws against white collar crime also protects the general populace, not only financially, but also from the physical harm associated with such hazards as unnecessary surgery, pollution, dangerous drugs, unsafe vehicles, and carcinogenic conditions in the workplace.

More pointed were the comments of Donald E. Santarelli, a former Justice Department official who was advising the Reagan transition team. Santarelli criticized what he called the Justice Department's "preoccupation with white collar crime" under Jimmy Carter. He too recommended renewed emphasis on "the type of crime that the public lives in fear of, which is violent street crime, not economic crime." Criminal statutes, in Santarelli's view, should only be applied to business activity where the conduct was "clearly willful, egregious, and malevolent." It might have been thought that a better standard of enforcement would be one whereby acts would be prosecuted if they violated the law.

The post-Watergate era has witnessed a modest redeployment of prosecutorial resources from crime in the streets to crime in the suites. Reversing this nascent trend will cost the American people dearly in loss of life and in monetary victimization. Criminal justice interventions to reduce

4. Ibid.
6. Overwhelming evidence supports Sutherland's assertion that "the financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the 'crime problem'" (Edwin Sutherland, White-Collar Crime [New York: Dryden, 1949], p. 12). Sutherland pointed out that the amounts misappropriated by many single white collar criminals exceed the total proceeds from reported burglaries and robberies. See also the recent replication of Sutherland's study in Marshall Clinard et al., Illegal Corporate Behavior (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, October 1979). Although it is easy to demonstrate that white collar crime costs the community more than does traditional crime, it is more
street crime, whether mediated by principles of deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation, can at best have only modest effects on the rate of offending. It will be argued in this paper that, in contrast, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation are viable strategies for fighting crime in the suites. Because crime in the suites is more costly and also more preventable by criminal justice intervention than is crime in the streets, the American people will be losers under the Reagan administration's new priorities. This argument will be advanced in the context of a more general set of propositions asserting that the conventional wisdom of criminology with respect to traditional crime should be inverted with corporate crime.

There also is a broader purpose in our presenting the six propositions which follow. We seek to establish that corporate crime is a conceptually different phenomenon from traditional crime. Corporate crime is defined as conduct of a corporation, or of individuals acting on behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and punishable by law. As we will see later, reforms to make the law an effective weapon against corporate crime are being demolished on the strength of caveats carried over from jurisprudence pertaining to crime in the streets. The propositions that follow specify reasons why principles developed in relation to traditional crime should not be assumed to apply to corporate offenses. Once the domains are accepted as conceptually separate, the burden of proof shifts; the opponent of legislation to control corporate crime must show why caveats from traditional criminal law should be regarded as relevant to the control of corporate crime.

SIX BASIC PROPOSITIONS

Proposition 1

With most traditional crimes, the fact that an offense has occurred is readily apparent; with most corporate crimes, the effect is not readily apparent.
When one person murders another, the corpse is there for people to see; or at least the fact that a person has disappeared is readily apparent. When, on the other hand, a miner dies from a lung disease, people may never appreciate that he has died because his employer violated mine safety regulations. Inevitably, most such violations are undetected. People who pay more to go to a movie because of price fixing among theater owners will not be aware that they have been victims of a crime. When taxes go up because Defense Department officials have accepted bribes to purchase more expensive ships or missiles than the country needs, no one knows that a crime has occurred and that we all have been its victims.

Such is the limited power of individuals for ill that when they perpetrate a traditional crime there is usually only one victim (or, at most, there are only a few victims) for each offense. These individual victims become acutely aware that another person has dealt them a blow. The structural reality of much corporate crime, in contrast, is one of diffuse effects. A million one-dollar victimizations will not generate the kind of public visibility that a single million-dollar victimization will.

Even when the effects of corporate crime are concentrated rather than diffuse, victim awareness is often not there. If a consumer pays an extra thousand dollars for a used car that has had its odometer turned back, he will almost never be aware of the fraud. The consumer might think that he has been sold a lemon, but not that he has been a victim of business crime. Similarly, when patients die from using a dangerous drug that was approved by health authorities on the strength of a bribe from a pharmaceutical company, a practice common in many countries, the crime is not apparent. Low visibility also follows from the fact that often the only witnesses to a crime are themselves implicated in the offense.

This first proposition has important implications for the difference between how law enforcers must go about controlling corporate versus traditional crime. Traditional crime control is reactive. The police normally do not investigate until a citizen reports a victimization. For corporate crimes, whose visibility is almost invariably masked through being em-


bedded in an ongoing transaction, the reactive model must be discarded for a proactive enforcement stance.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Proposition 2}

Once an offense becomes apparent, apprehending a suspect can be difficult with traditional crime, but is almost always easy with corporate crime.

When a house is robbed, or when a car is reported as missing, it is often a difficult job for the police to find the burglar or the car thief. Great public expense is incurred to achieve unremarkable clearance rates for these types of offenses.\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, in the unlikely event that a sick worker discovers his illness is the result of an industrial health violation at work, almost by definition the law enforcement agency can identify a corporate suspect—the worker's employer. Similarly, if it is discovered that a bribe has been passed to secure a particular defense contract, there is an immediate suspect, the corporation that benefits from the contract. There was no need for the police to print "Wanted" posters or to set up roadblocks to find the corporate suspect when it was discovered that bribes were accepted in many countries throughout the world to secure sales of Lockheed aircraft.

This second proposition more than counterbalances the first in its implications for the potential effectiveness of corporate crime control. Corporate crime investigators cannot enjoy the luxury of sitting back in their offices waiting for the telephone to ring to notify them of the offense, but they are saved the tribulations of identikit photos, fingerprinting, and all the other paraphernalia that burden police in pursuit of traditional types of suspects.

With the use of proactive enforcement, there are many ways in which the disadvantage of invisibility could be swamped by the advantage to the enforcement agency of not having to apprehend the suspect. Although odometer frauds are invisible to the victims, representatives of law en-

\textsuperscript{13} Carson ("White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation," p. 390) found that only 5 percent of Factories Act violations in Britain were reported to, as opposed to discovered by, the Factories Inspectorate. Even with consumer affairs offenses in which there are victims who become aware of their victimization, a proactive approach is typically required to stop the offense before the offender disappears and aggrieved consumers begin to trickle into the agency. (See Philip G. Schrag, "On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City," Yale Law Journal, July 1971, p. 1586). On proactive enforcement tactics generally, see Herbert Edelhertz, The Investigation of White-Collar Crime: A Manual for Law Enforcement Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1977).

\textsuperscript{14} In 1976 in the United States, only 14.4 percent of motor vehicle thefts were cleared by arrest. For property crimes generally, the clearance rate was 18 percent; for violent offenses, it was 45.5 percent. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1978 (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1979), p. 502.
enforcement agencies could readily observe the mileage readings of cars standing in used car lots and then check back with the former owners to establish the mileage readings at the time of sale. If the enforcement agency were in a position to deliver the cars to the company itself, it would not even have to rely on the memory of the former owners.15

Our first two propositions together may constitute an argument for tactics that might involve or border on entrapment.16 Nevertheless, it is an argument that demands consideration in corporate crime cases. Under the reactive enforcement model for traditional crimes, entrapment is hardly necessary. Law enforcement agencies have quite enough offenses reported to them and need not create more. Should they decide that they do want to create more offenses, given how little the police know about who is committing most of them, deciding whom to entrap would be difficult.

In contrast, if one accepts the inevitability of a proactive enforcement model for white collar crime, investigators may have little choice but to create their own offenses. For some types of white collar crimes, entrapment may be one of the few ways of doing this. The present authors differ with respect to the FBI’s tactics in the ABSCAM case; but consider the options available for the conviction of political bribe takers. The FBI does not have citizens calling the agency claiming to be victims of political bribes, yet it does have intelligence on who the corrupt politicians are. Such intelligence rarely is sufficient to sustain criminal charges. The use of entrapment ruses for corrupt politicians may be more necessary and less indiscriminate than is the entrapment of, say, drug users by the offer of a deal. It can also be argued that holders of public office and the primary beneficiaries of the economic system have a special obligation to obey the law and to resist temptation.

Readers may conclude that entrapment is unacceptable with respect to either white collar or traditional crime. However, the balance of considerations that lead to this conclusion under the proactive model of white collar crime enforcement should be very different than the factors weighed for the types of offenses that can be handled under the reactive model.

Proposition 3

Once the suspect has been apprehended, proving guilt is usually easy with traditional crime, but almost always difficult with corporate crime.

Especially for less serious traditional crimes, the police have little difficulty in obtaining a conviction, particularly when they are willing to plea

bargain. Once the police have made up their minds that a person is guilty and deserves to go to court, a conviction usually will follow.\(^{17}\) When enforcement officers decide that a corporation probably is guilty of an offense and deserves to go to court, a conviction is usually not the result. Indeed, it does not normally eventuate that the matter will go to court.\(^ {18}\) The high costs to the state of corporate prosecutions, which work against pursuing the case in court, may be not only financial (e.g., legal fees) but also political (e.g., votes and campaign contributions, which may produce understandable caution among conservative bureaucrats in dealing with powerful actors).

Even where these costs are deemed to be bearable, the government will often lose in court because the complexity of the law\(^ {19}\) or the complexity of the company's books\(^ {20}\) makes it impossible to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. There is a considerable difference, for instance, between convicting a corporation that takes money by fraud and convicting an individual who takes it at the point of a gun: "Criminal intent is not as easily inferred from a taking executed through a market transaction, as it is from a taking by force."\(^ {21}\) Corporations, unlike individuals, have the resources to employ the legal talent to exploit this inherent complexity. Good lawyers who use complexity to cast "reasonable doubt" on the applicability of existing statutes to the behavior of their client also use complexity to protract proceedings and thereby push up the cost disincentives for the prosecution to continue with formal proceedings.\(^ {22}\)

In addition to the complexity of the law and the complexity of the books, there is the complexity of the organizational reality of corporate action. Every individual in a large organization can present a different

\(^{17}\) Only 2.8 percent of defendants in cases terminated before United States district courts in 1977 were found not guilty. \textit{Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1979} (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1980), p. 555.


\(^{22}\) For various examples of the use of delaying tactics by company lawyers, see Mark J. Green, \textit{The Other Government: The Unseen Power of Washington Lawyers}, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).
version of what company policy was, and individual corporate actors can blame others for their own actions (x says he was following y's instructions, y says that x misunderstood instructions she had passed down from z, ad infinitum). So how can either company policy or any individual company employee be guilty? Even if this is not what actually happened, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove otherwise.

There is, in addition, the complexity of science. Pollution, product safety, and occupational safety and health prosecutions typically turn on scientific evidence that the corporation caused certain consequences. In cases that involve scientific dispute, proof beyond reasonable doubt is rarely, if ever, possible. Science deals in probabilities, not certainties. The superstructure of science is erected on a foundation of mathematical statistics which estimate a probability that inferences are true or false. Logically, proof beyond reasonable doubt that a "causes" b is impossible. It is always possible that an observed correlation between a and b is explained by an unknown third variable, c. The scientist can never eliminate all the possible third variables. Hence, to require proof beyond reasonable doubt that a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act caused an observed level of drug impurity, which in turn caused fifty deaths, is to require the impossible.

The problem is illustrated by the federal OSHA statute. It requires proof that the violation was willful and caused death before a criminal conviction can stand. OSHA counsel explained to one of the authors that when fifty-one Research-Cottrell workers were killed by the collapse of scaffolding for a water tower, the fact that OSHA regulations had been violated was clear, the fact that workers died was clear, but proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was the violations (rather than other factors) that caused the scaffolding to collapse was another matter. The complexity of the forces that caused the scaffolding to collapse was such that it was represented by a computer simulation. OSHA counsel decided, undoubtedly correctly, that a computer simulation was more complexity than any jury could stand.

That the complexity of corporate crime and the power and legal resources of the defendants make convictions much more difficult than

23. It may be that individual corporate actors are following standard operating procedures which were written by a committee, many of whose members are now retired, deceased, or working elsewhere. Consider Simeon M. Kriesberg, "Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime," Yale Law Journal, July 1976, pp. 1091-129.

24. In Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Braithwaite concludes that many corporations present to the outside world a picture of diffused accountability for law observance, while ensuring that lines of accountability are in fact clearly defined for internal compliance purposes.

25. See the discussion of this problem in relation to the Abbott case study, ibid., ch. 4.
with traditional crime hardly needs to be labored. This difficulty rather than the low visibility of offenses (Proposition 1) is the real stumbling block to effective corporate crime control. Consequently, it will be the barriers to conviction rather than those to discovery and apprehension that will be the focus of reforms considered in the final part of the paper.

**Proposition 4**

Once an offender has been convicted, deterrence is doubtful with traditional crime, but may well be strong with corporate crime.

Specific must be distinguished from general deterrence. The former refers to the deterrence of the offender who is actually convicted. The case for specific deterrence is weak with traditional crime. Offenders who are incarcerated may be more embittered than deterred by the experience. They appear less likely to learn the error of their ways while in prison than to learn better ways of committing crimes. This is not likely to be true of persons convicted of corporate crime. A feature that distinguishes traditional from corporate crime is that the illegitimate skills (e.g., safe-cracking) involved in the former are learned in criminal settings (e.g., prison), while the illegitimate skills (e.g., concealing transactions in books of account) of the corporate criminal are learned in legitimate noncriminal settings. While the illegitimate skills of burglars may be developed while they are incarcerated, those of crooked accountants will simply become increasingly out of date as they languish in prison.

A major risk in apprehending the traditional criminal is that the stigmatizing process will push him further and further into a criminal self-concept. This is the contention of labeling theory. Evidence such as that


from the Cambridge longitudinal study of delinquency has been interpreted as support for the labeling hypothesis. This study showed that boys who were apprehended for and convicted of delinquent offenses became more delinquent than boys who were equally delinquent to begin with but who escaped apprehension. West and Farrington note about their findings,

Court appearances may aggravate already tense family situations, alienate youths still further from their teachers and employers, and discourage their more respectable companions of either sex from continuing to associate with them. The sanctions imposed by the courts in the shape of fines are likely to increase the delinquent's debts, thereby increasing the temptation to dishonesty, while doing nothing to teach him to manage his finances better. Even supervision by a probation officer can be a mixed blessing, if it helps to confirm the youngster's self-identification with delinquent groups.

These labeling arguments cannot readily be applied to corporate offenders. They are likely to regard themselves as unfairly maligned pillars of respectability, and no amount of stigmatization is apt to convince them otherwise. One does meet people who have a mental image of themselves as a thief, a safecracker, a prostitute, a pimp, a drug runner, and even a hit man, but how often does one meet a person who sees himself as a corporate criminal? The young black offender can often enhance his status back on the street by having done some time, but the reaction of the corporate criminal to incarceration is shame and humiliation.

Such an observation has important implications. Although the labeling hypothesis makes it unwise to use publicity as a tool to punish juvenile delinquents, it is sound deterrence to broadcast widely the names of corporate offenders. Corporations and their officers are genuinely afraid of bad publicity arising from their illegitimate activities. They respond to it with moral indignation and denials, not with assertions that "if you think I'm bad, I'll really show you how bad I can be," as juvenile delinquents sometimes do.

Chambliss argues that white collar criminals are among the most deterable types of offenders because they satisfy two conditions: They do not have a commitment to crime as a way of life, and their offenses are instru-

30. Ibid., p. 162.
mental rather than expressive. Corporate crimes are almost never crimes of passion; they are not spontaneous or emotional, but calculated risks taken by rational actors. As such, they should be more amenable to control by policies based on the utilitarian assumptions of the deterrence doctrine.

Individual corporate criminals are also more deterrable because they have more of those valued possessions that can be lost through a criminal conviction, such as social status, respectability, money, a job, and a comfortable home and family life. As Geerken and Gove hypothesize, “the effectiveness of [a] deterrence system will increase as the individual’s investment in and rewards from the social system increase.” Clinard and Meier, moreover, place particular emphasis on the “future orientation” of white-collar criminals:

Punishment may work best with those individuals who are “future oriented” and who are thus worried about the effect of punishment on their future plans and their social status rather than being concerned largely with the present and having little or no concern about their status. For this reason gang boys may be deterred by punishment less strongly than the white-collar professional person.

In general, the arguments about the deterrability of individuals convicted of corporate crimes are equally applicable to the corporations themselves. Corporations are future oriented, concerned about their reputation, and quintessentially rational. Although most individuals do not possess the information necessary to calculate rationally the probability of detection and punishment, corporations have information-gathering systems designed precisely for this purpose. Hence, conclude Ermann and Lundman, “business concerns have regularly engaged in price fixing . . . under the correct assumption that the benefits outweigh the costs.”

The specific deterrent value of fines can be questioned for both

traditional and corporate offenders. A large fine imposed upon a poor property offender might leave him little option but to steal again so as to be able to pay the fine. With corporations the problem is to be able to set a fine large enough to have a deterrent effect.

The $7 million fine which was levied against the Ford Motor Company for environmental violations was certainly more than a slap on the wrist, but it rather pales beside the estimated $250 million loss which the company sustained on the Edsel. Both represent environmental contingencies which managers are paid high salaries to handle. We know they handled the latter—the first seven years of the Mustang more than offset the Edsel losses. One can only infer that they worked out ways to handle the fine too.

Although the fine itself may be an ineffective deterrent when used against the corporate criminal, other sanctions associated with the prosecution—unfavorable publicity, the harrowing experience for the senior executive of days under cross-examination, the dislocation of top management from their normal duties so that they can defend the corporation against public attacks—can be important specific deterrents.

General deterrence is an effect more difficult to establish empirically. General deterrence refers to the consequences of a conviction for those who are not caught, but who through observing the penalties imposed on others decide not to violate the law. The state of the evidence on general deterrence for common crime, and how scholars interpret that evidence, is


43. Hopkins, in a personal communication concerning his interviews with Australian Trade Practices Act offenders, pointed out that executives reported the experience of testifying in court to be grueling. Andrew Hopkins, “Anatomy of Corporate Crime,” in Two Faces of Deviance, Wilson and Braithwaite, eds., pp. 214–31. See also the Abbott case study in Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, ch. 4. One informant said of his fellow executives who were acquitted in this case, “The guys who were defendants in that case, some of them are basket cases today. They’ve never been the same since.”

44. This dislocation is even worse when top management is actually replaced because of a corporate crime scandal, something that happens not infrequently when the scandal is of major proportions.
in turmoil.\textsuperscript{45} It seems fair to say, however, that there has been a growing disillusionment with how much crime prevention can be achieved through deterrence, particularly of offenders from lower socioeconomic levels. Disillusionment has progressed so far that, whereas once the conventional wisdom of conservative criminology demanded that high imprisonment rates be justified by deterrence, now incarceration conventionally is based on the idea of just deserts.\textsuperscript{46}

The evidence on the deterrent effects of sanctions against corporate crime is not nearly so voluminous, but the consensus among scholars is overwhelmingly optimistic concerning general deterrence.\textsuperscript{47} This may in part reflect an uncritical acceptance of the empirically untested assumption that because corporate crime is a notably rational economic activity, it must be more subject to general deterrence.

However, the faith in the efficacy of general deterrence for corporate crime is not totally blind, as can be illustrated by a number of instances of corporate reaction to enforcement strategies. For example, business executives in Australia were asked whether the introduction of the Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974, with its relatively severe penalties, affected their behavior.\textsuperscript{48} Survey respondents claimed that the legislation caused them to abandon certain price-fixing agreements with competitors and introduce antitrust "compliance programs." A more sophisticated study by Block et al. found that U.S. Justice Department antitrust prosecutions in the bread industry had significant and notable specific and general deterrent effects on price fixing. The degree of deterrence was surpris-


ing, given that bread price fixers have never been sent to jail and that fines average only 0.3 percent of the annual sales of the colluding firms. The Block et al. data suggest that deterrence is mainly mediated by civil treble damage suits that follow in the wake of criminal conviction.49

The most impressive evidence is from Lewis-Beck and Alford's study of United States coal mine safety enforcement.50 Using a multiple interrupted time series analysis, these authors were able to show that the considerable increases in enforcement expenditure which followed the toughening of the mine safety legislation in 1941 and 1969 were both associated with dramatic reductions in coal mine fatality rates. The cosmetic 1952 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, which actually arrested the rate of increase in Bureau of Mines enforcement expenditures, had no effect on fatality rates. Controls introduced into the regression models refute an interpretation that the historical trends are the result of technological advances in mining, changes in mine size, or variations in the types of mining operations. The most parsimonious interpretation of the data is that the rate of deaths from coal mine accidents is less than one-quarter of the rate of fatal accidents occurring before the 1941 legislation because of the deterrent effects of law enforcement.

Proposition 5

Although incapacitation is not apt to be very effective or acceptable for controlling traditional crime in a humane society, it can be a highly successful strategy in the control of corporate crime.

Traditional criminals can be incapacitated if the society is willing to countenance severe solutions. If we execute murderers, they will never murder again; or we can lock them up and never let them out. Pickpockets can be incapacitated by our cutting off their hands. Most contemporary societies are not prepared to resort to such barbaric methods. Instead, the widely used punishment is imprisonment for periods of months or years. Yet only partial incapacitation is in effect while the offender is incarcerated. Offenders continue to murder, to rape, and to commit a multitude of less serious offenses while they are in prison. Indeed, the chances of being a victim of homicide in the United States are five times as high for white males inside prison as for those outside.51 And the partial incapacitation of prison lasts only as long as the sentence.

The limits of incapacitation as a policy become more apparent when we

51. Marvin Wolfgang, personal communication.

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ask who is to be incapacitated. A substantial body of evidence shows that no matter how we attempt to predict dangerousness, the success rate is very low. Any policy of selective incarceration to "protect society" will result in prisons full of "false positives."

The most sophisticated study of the reduction in crime that might be achieved by incapacitation is by Van Dine, Conrad, and Dinitz. For their Ohio cohort, a severe sentencing policy of a flat five-year term for any adult or juvenile convicted of a felony would have prevented only 7.3 percent of the reported crimes of the cohort. Such estimates are of limited value, of course, because there is no way of knowing how many unreported crimes might also have been prevented. Nevertheless, even under generous assumptions about the prevention of unreported crime, Van Dine et al. conclude that incapacitation can never be a cost-effective rationale for a tough sentencing policy. Notwithstanding this conclusion, Van Dine and his colleagues fail to take account of a variety of homeostatic forces, more recently considered by Reiss, which further weaken incapacitative effects. For example, to what extent do criminal groups recruit new members to replace those who are incarcerated, or increase their own rate of offending to make up for the shortfall in criminal production arising from the absence of one member from the group? More fundamentally, studies such as that of Van Dine et al. make the false assumption that if 1,000 offenses were committed by offenders during a period of freedom, then 1,000 crimes would have been prevented if those people had been in prison for that period. The assumption is false because most offenses are not committed by lone offenders. If the man who drove the getaway car in a robbery had been in prison, the robbery might still have gone ahead without him. For these additional reasons, we are even more strongly inclined to agree with the conclusion of Van Dine et al. that "we


55. Reiss points out that National Crime Survey data indicate that only 30 percent of offenders in victim-reported crime incidents were lone offenders. Ibid.
do not know how to bound a whole class of wicked people, and the evidence of this research suggests that we never will.\textsuperscript{56}

Incapacitation is more workable with corporate criminals because their kind of criminal activity is dependent on their being able to maintain legitimacy in formalized roles in the economy. We do not have to cut off the hands of surgeons who increase their income by having patients undergo unnecessary surgery. All we need do is deregister them. Similarly, we can prevent people from acting in such formal roles as company directors, product safety managers, environmental engineers, lawyers, and accountants swiftly and without barbarism. Should we want only short-term incapacitation, we can, as Stone advocates, prohibit a person \textit{"for a period of three years from serving as officer, director, or consultant of any corporation. \dots"}.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, an incapacitative court order could be even more finely tuned. The prohibition could be against the person's serving in any position entailing decision making that might influence the quality of the environment. Corporate crime's total dependence on incumbency in roles in the economy renders possible this tailor-made incapacitation. It makes the shotgun approach to incapacitation for common crimes look very crude indeed. However, the substitution problems that plague traditional incapacitative models are also a major constraint on the efficacy of incapacitating individuals who have been responsible for corporate crime. If, for example, the corporation is committed to cutting corners on environmental emissions, it can replace one irresponsible environmental engineer with another who is equally willing to violate the law.

This is where court orders to incapacitate the whole organization become necessary. Capital punishment for the corporation is one possibility: The charter of a corporation can be revoked, the corporation can be put in the hands of a receiver, or it can be nationalized. Although corporate capital punishment is not as barbaric as execution of individual persons, it is an extreme measure which courts undoubtedly would be loath to adopt, especially considering the unemployment caused by terminating an enterprise (although this does not apply to nationalizing it). Even though court-ordered corporate death sentences may be politically unrealistic, there are cases where regulatory agencies through their harassment of criminal corporations have bankrupted fairly large concerns.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Van Dine et al., \textit{Restraining the Wicked}, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{57} Stone, \textit{Where the Law Ends}, pp. 148-49.
\textsuperscript{58} Schrag ("On Her Majesty’s Secret Service") recounts how Detective, a publicly traded company which was defrauding consumers, was bankrupted in the aftermath of a "direct action" campaign by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. See below for a discussion of Schrag's "direct action" tactics against corporate offenders. Industrial Bio-Test, one of the largest contract-testing laboratories in the United States, was bankrupted by the Food and Drug Administration after allegations had been made that it fudged data on the safety testing of drugs. Pharmaceutical companies ceased giving their toxicology testing contracts to IBT after the FDA warned them that data submitted to the agency that had been collected by IBT would be subjected to a special audit.
A less draconian remedy is to limit the charter of a company by preventing it from continuing those aspects of its operations where it has flagrantly failed to respect the law. Alternatively, as part of a consent decree, a corporation could be forced to sell that part of its business which has been the locus of continued law violation. The participation of the regulatory agency in the negotiations would serve to ensure that the sale was to a new parent with an exemplary record of compliance. This kind of remedy becomes increasingly useful in an era when the diversified conglomerate is the modal form of industrial organization. Forcing a conglomerate to sell one of its divisions would, in addition to having incapacitative effects, be a strong deterrent in cases where the division made sound profits. Deterrence and incapacitation can be achieved without harm to the economy or to innocent employees.

Effective incapacitative strategies for corporate crime are, therefore, possible. All that is required is for legislatures, courts, and regulatory agencies to apply them creatively, to overcome the conservatism that leaves them clinging to the failed remedies carried over from traditional crime. The goal of incapacitation illustrates better than any other how the effective and just means for achieving criminal justice goals cannot be the same with corporate crime as with traditional crime. Consider, for example, the application to the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation of a law that forbids offenders convicted of a felony from carrying guns. Mintz has described what happened after Olin Mathieson was convicted of conspiracy concerning bribes to get foreign aid contracts in Cambodia and Vietnam:

It happened that there was a law which said in essence that a person who had been convicted of a felony could not transport a weapon in interstate commerce. This created a legal problem for Olin, because it had been convicted of a felony, was in the eyes of the law a person and had a division that made weapons for use by the armed forces. Congress resolved the dilemma by enacting a law that, in effect, got Olin off the hook.

Here we are struck by the absurdity of automatically applying to corporations an incapacitative policy designed for individuals. It will be argued later that this absurdity of applying law governing the behavior of individuals to the crimes of collectivities is the fundamental impediment to effective corporate crime control.

59. The coal industry is a classic illustration of how some corporations are well known to have a superior record of compliance compared with the performance of others. Generally, it is the mines owned by the large steel corporations, with the safety compliance systems they bring from their parent industry, that have superior safety performance. In 1978–79 Westmorland Coal Co. had an injury incidence rate seven times as high as the rate in mines owned by U.S. Steel. Ben A. Franklin, "New Effort to Make Mines Safer," *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1980, pp. L29, L32.

Proposition 6

Even though rehabilitation has failed as a doctrine for the control of traditional crime, it can succeed with corporate crime.

The disenchantment of criminologists in the past two decades with rehabilitation as a response to traditional crime has been even more profound than has the disillusionment with deterrence. The high tide of this change was the publication of the massive and detailed review of the effectiveness of correctional rehabilitation programs by Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks. Even though Martinson stated at a later time that the review should not be used to justify a wholesale rejection of rehabilitation as a goal for the criminal justice system, the raw data which aroused the mood of pessimism are still there for all to see; and since the publication of the review there has hardly been a flood of studies showing that rehabilitative programs really do reduce crime.

There is little reason to suspect that individuals responsible for corporate crime, or white collar crime generally, should be any more amenable to rehabilitation than are traditional offenders. As Morris noted,

What would Jimmy Hoffa discuss with his caseworker, in or out of prison, relevant to Hoffa’s psyche or the manipulation of power within a union? A discussion between Spiro Agnew and his probation officer, had any unfortunate been appointed to that task, is even more mind boggling.

Although rehabilitating individuals would seem as unpromising with corporate as with traditional offenders, rehabilitating the corporation itself is a different matter. Many corporate crimes arise from defective control systems, insufficient checks and balances within the organization to ensure the law is complied with, poor communication, and inadequate standard operating procedures which fail to incorporate safeguards against reckless behavior. Sometimes these organizational defects are intentional, manifesting a conscious decision by the corporate hierarchy to turn a blind eye to corner cutting in order to get results. Sometimes the defects reflect sloppiness or managerial negligence. The chief executive of a pharmaceutical company, for example, might consciously ignore a situation in which his quality control director was overruled by the production manager when a batch of drugs was rejected for want of purity. If the organization were reformed so that the person responsible for achieving

64. Stone, Where the Law Ends, pp. 199–216.
production targets was no longer able to overrule quality control, and if only the chief executive officer could reverse a quality control finding, and then only in writing, the chief executive could no longer turn a blind eye to avoid the situation.  

Regulatory agencies have an arsenal of weapons with which to force corporations to correct criminogenic policies and practices. They can insist upon, for example, abolition of off-the-books accounts, multiple approvals for specified actions, routine reporting of certain matters to committees of outside directors, and the establishment of internal compliance groups who report directly to the board with recommendations for sanctioning individuals who fail to abide by corporate policies. Rehabilitation is a more workable strategy with corporate crime than with traditional crime because criminogenic organizational structures are more malleable than are criminogenic human personalities. A new internal compliance group can be put in place much more readily than can a new superego. Moreover, state-imposed reorganization of the structure of a publicly traded company is not so unconscionable an encroachment on individual freedom as is state-imposed rearrangement of a psyche.  

Hopkins, in the only systematic published study of the rehabilitation of corporate offenders, concluded that most companies prosecuted under the consumer protection provisions of the Australian Trade Practices Act introduced at least some measures to ensure that the offense did not recur. Case studies based on interviews by Fisse and one of the present authors with executives involved in major corporate crimes in America confirm Hopkins’s finding. In the aftermath of public disclosure of corporate crimes and the ensuing scandals, many, although not all, corporations changed internal policies and procedures to reduce the probability of reoffending. Much of this corporate rehabilitation undoubtedly took place because of prodding by regulatory agencies. Large corporations tend to be responsive to the demands of regulators in making internal reform following the unveiling of a corporate crime in part because they want the pressure exerted by regulators to cease. 

A number of formal mechanisms can be used to bring about corporate

65. For a more detailed discussion of this kind of organizational defect, see Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, chs. 3, 4, and 9.
66. For a criticism of the rehabilitative model in these terms for individual deviance, see Philip Bean, Rehabilitation and Deviance (London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
68. These data will be published in a forthcoming book by Fisse and Braithwaite on the effects of adverse publicity on corporate crime.
rehabilitation: consent decrees negotiated with regulatory agencies; probation orders placing the corporation under the supervision of an auditor, environmental expert, or other authority who would ensure that an order to restructure compliance systems was carried out; or suspended sentencing of convicted corporations by the courts, contingent on their producing a report on the weaknesses of their old compliance systems and implementing new ones.

DISCUSSION

It has been argued that the largely discredited doctrines of crime control by public disgrace, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation could become highly successful when applied to corporate crime. More generally, it has been argued that when the accumulated insight of criminology tells us that something is true of traditional crime, in many respects we can expect the opposite to be true of corporate crime.

Hence, there is reason for optimism that where we have failed with street crime, we might succeed with suite crime. There is justification for regarding President Reagan's signaling of a return to pre-Watergate criminal justice priorities as contrary to the public interest. Because corporate crime is more preventable than other types of crime, the persons and property of citizens can be better protected; and restitution is a more viable goal for corporate than for traditional criminal law. Convicted corporations generally have a better capacity than do individuals to compensate the victims of their crimes.

Even though corporate crime is potentially more preventable and its victims are more readily compensated, there is no guarantee that either prevention or restitution will happen under traditional legal systems. This is because of our third proposition: Convictions are extremely difficult in complex cases involving powerful corporations. There are at least two ways of dealing with this problem. One is for regulatory agencies to achieve the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation by non-

70. This technique has been particularly popular with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. For a more refined version of this general approach, see Fisse's development of the idea of court-imposed "preventive orders." W. Brent Fisse, "Responsibility, Prevention and Corporate Crime," New Zealand Universities Law Review, April 1973, pp. 250–79.


prosecutorial means. They readily can do this if they have sufficient bargaining power. Consider the tactics of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the foreign bribery scandals of the latter half of the 1970s. In many cases the agency may have effected significant deterrence through the adverse publicity that followed public disclosure of the largest scandals, a modicum of incapacitation in cases where corporations forced responsible senior executives into early retirement, and a considerable amount of rehabilitation through consent orders that mandated audit committees of outside directors, outlawed off-the-books accounts, and led to other reforms which, although far from eliminating the prospect of bribery, certainly made it a much riskier and therefore less rational business practice. At the same time, criticism of the agency on a number of grounds regarding the small number of cases referred to the Justice Department for prosecution assuredly was justified.

In an illuminating article detailing why law enforcers so often choose to practice informal enforcement, Schrag discusses why he abandoned the prosecutorial stance that he brought to his position as head of the enforcement division of the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. A variety of frustrations, especially the use of delaying tactics by company lawyers, led to substitution of a "direct action" model for the "judicial" model. Nonlitigious methods which were increasingly used included threats and use of adverse publicity, revocation of licenses, direct contact of consumers to warn them of company practices, and pressure exerted on reputable financial institutions and suppliers to withdraw support of the targeted company. As Schrag points out, the dilemma of the direct action model is that it gets results without any regard for the due process rights of targeted "offenders."

An alternative to substituting the direct action for the judicial model is

73. While this adverse publicity may have had effects on company morale, such effects in most cases did not filter through to depress stock prices significantly. The stock market effects were somewhat more notable, however, with the companies named early in the foreign bribery campaign. Paul A. Griffin, "Sensitive Foreign Payment Disclosures: The Securities Market Impact" (mimeo; Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, June 1977).

74. In some corporations (e.g., Lockheed, Northrop, Gulf) these included chief executive officers. The new chief executives in some cases really did seem to act as if they were the new broom attempting to sweep things clean.


76. Bequai, for example, says, "The SEC has been firing blanks. Who gets hurt in consent settlements? The SEC gets a notch on its gun. The law firm gets money, the public is happy because they read 'fraud' in the newspaper and think criminality right away. The company neither admits nor denies anything. It's the perfect accommodation. And it's all one big charade." August Bequai, "Why the SEC's Enforcer Is in Over His Head," Business Week, Oct. 11, 1976, p. 70.

77. Schrag, "On Her Majesty's Secret Service."
to reform the law so that the conviction of guilty corporations is made easier.\textsuperscript{78} The precise nature of such reform is beyond the scope of the present paper. What we have attempted is to establish a case for the premise to undergird such a program of law reform: The fact that a principle has been found to be justified in dealing with traditional crime is not a satisfactory rationale for its application to corporate crime. If valid, the six propositions in this paper force the conclusion that corporate crime is a conceptually quite different domain from traditional crime. Consequently, we should never reject a strategy for controlling corporate crime merely because that strategy has been found wanting, on the grounds of either justice or efficacy, with traditional crime.

Consider, for example, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. In some Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions there have been debates regarding abolition of the right to trial by jury for a variety of corporate and other white collar crimes. The rationale for such a move has been expressed in the following terms: "If the jury cannot understand the issues, the right to a jury may conflict with something more basic, the right to a fair trial."\textsuperscript{79} Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, former United States attorney general and now IBM general counsel, once said, "The better your case, the better off you are with a judge. The weaker your case, the better off you are with the jury."\textsuperscript{80}

In New South Wales, Australia, when such a measure was considered, the reaction from the financial establishment was vociferous. The influential Australian Financial Review argued, "In moving away from trial by jury as a right on charges which can lead to imprisonment, NSW appears to be going out on a limb from the trunk of English law."\textsuperscript{81} A counterproposition well could be that we should dynamite the "trunk of English law" and plant a new tree better suited to the climate of corporate offenses. Where, then, should the burden of proof lie: with the reform proposal to control corporate crime or with the tried-and-true forest of traditional laws? If corporate crime and traditional crime are accepted as conceptually different domains, we would suggest that it is the opponent of legislation to control corporate crime who should show why caveats pertaining to traditional enforcement should be regarded as relevant to the control of corporate crime.

Unfortunately, as new reforms emerge that are designed with tradition-

\textsuperscript{78} It is interesting to juxtapose this alternative against the "direct action" approach with respect to the due process protections available to targets of government sanction. Perhaps if corporations are not stripped of some due process protections so that convictions can become more possible, governments will increasingly be forced to take the "direct action" route, with its total absence of due process.

\textsuperscript{79} Time, Dec. 3, 1979, p. 61.


al individual offenses in mind, not only is the burden of proof with those who would oppose the automatic imposition of the reforms on corporate offenses, but, moreover, questions about the reforms’ effects on white collar and corporate crime are rarely asked. The United States Supreme Court has denied corporations the privilege against self-incrimination, while individuals still enjoy that privilege. And the Court has accepted that publicly traded companies “can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.” So why could we not also see a dismantling of many of the protections designed to protect powerless individuals from the abusive use of the superior power of the state when it is powerful corporations that are being protected? When, for example, a corporation is on trial in a case whose verdict would not jeopardize the liberty of any individual, why could not proof “on the balance of probabilities” be substituted for proof “beyond reasonable doubt”? Corporations will fight vigorously attempts to deny them any due process protections that are available to individuals. Yet the law of individualism can never be effective against the crimes of collectivities. As Fisse has observed, “[I]ndividualistic strength is not enough to match collectivist might without undermining the very traditions of justice for which individualism stands.” Unless we can accept corporate crime as a conceptually separate problem from traditional crime, the powerful will continue to ensure that “collectivist might” prevails in courts of law. This will be achieved by appeal to “the very traditions of justice for which individualism stands.”

82. “While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions, . . . it does not follow that a corporation vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906). Note: “The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege against Self-Incrimination,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, January 1964, p. 394.


85. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 131, sets loss of liberty apart as the sanction that demands the full panoply of due process protections whenever there is any risk of its application: “Labels aside, the combination of stigma and loss of liberty involved in a conditional or absolute sentence of imprisonment sets the sanction apart from anything else the law imposes. When the law permits that degree of severity, the defendant should be entitled to litigate the issue of culpability by raising the kinds of defenses we have been considering. If the burden on the courts is thought to be too great, a less severe sanction than imprisonment should be the maximum provided for. The legislature ought not to be allowed to have it both ways.”