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» Rafe de Crespigny
The Government and Geography
of the Northern Frontier of Late Han
Internet edition 2004
Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University
NOTE: Chapter 1 from
Northern Frontier: the policies and strategy
of the Later Han empire, by Rafe de Crespigny, originally
published in
Asian Studies Monographs, New Series No. 4, Faculty
of Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra 1984 [ISBN
0 86784 410 8]. Characters and full notes are not included, but some summary
annotations are given, and a map is provided.
© The whole work is copyright.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research,
criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may
be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should
be made to the
Faculty of Asian Studies at
the Australian National University
Table of contents
The structure of local administration
To a remarkable degree, the
forms of local administration under Han were unified throughout the empire. Though
the problems of the frontier on the north were clearly different from those of
the settled areas within the empire or the expanding colonisation of the lands
to the south, the pattern of government was the same, and the administrative
units of commanderies (jun) and counties (xian) provided the
essential structure.
Under the government of Later
Han, all China was divided into some one hundred commandery units, and
subordinate to each commandery were a various number of county units, almost
1200 altogether. The chief official of a commandery, the Grand Administrator (taishou),
was ranked at the salary level of 2000 shi, just below the status of a
minister at the capital. His senior subordinates were the Assistant (cheng),
responsible for the civilian administration of the commandery, including such
matters as taxation and official appointments, and the Commandant (wei),
whose duties included such matters as the suppression of banditry and the
supervision of recruitment for military service. In the frontier commanderies,
as a reflection of the greater danger and responsibility, this officer was
given the title of Chief Commandant (duwei), and some commanderies had
more than one chief commandant, each responsible for a different territory (duwei
bu).
These chief officials of the
commandery were appointed directly by the central government, as were the
officials in charge of the counties. A county of large population, over ten
thousand households, was administered by a Prefect (ling), with salary
and rank at 1000 shi. A smaller county was headed by a Chief (zhang),
with salary of 400 or 300 shi. As in the commandery, prefects and chiefs
had assistants and commandants, who were also commissioned by the central
government. Both in commanderies and counties, however, the lower ranks of
administration, from senior secretaries to yamen runners, were held by men
recruited locally.
There were some variations in
the nomenclature of the commandery and county units: when a commandery was
given as a royal fief to a member of the imperial family its description was
changed to kingdom (guo), and the chief administrator was described as
Chancellor (xiang). Similarly, the head of a county which had been
designated as the fief of a marquis (houguo) was also given the title of
Chancellor. In the frontier territories, moreover, a number of county units
were described as marches (dao), or dependent states (shuguo) and
special provision was made for their surveillance of non-Chinese peoples.
In this matter, however, the
distinction between civilian and military administration begins to blur. Marches,
it would seem, were regarded merely as a special type of county, but dependent
states were developed both at county and at commandery level, and in the reign
of Emperor An, early in the second century AD, a number of dependent states
were formally established as commandery-type units, with subordinate counties
or marches, and were administered by chief commandants rather than by grand
administrators.
Under the Later Han system,
the title of Chief Commandant could indicate any of three different types of
responsibility: the chief military assistant to the grand administrator of a
frontier commandery; the executive head of a commandery-level dependent state; and
thirdly, very commonly, the title was given to the officer holding
responsibility for the administration of a fixed military unit: a garrison, a
camp, a fortified pass or an extended base of supply. In this way, for example,
we find chief commandants in charge of agricultural settlements (nong duwei)
and others responsible for major garrison and training camps, as at Yong near Chang'an
or Liyang in Wei commandery. It appears, moreover, that the garrisons of the
Great Wall, as a static military installation, were also administered by chief
commandants, with subordinate companies (houguan), platoons (hou)
and sections (sui).
The various armies which were
raised from time to time by the imperial government for special expeditions
were not, of course, controlled by the garrison commandants, but by generals (jiangjun)
and colonels (xiaowei) appointed for the campaign. On the other hand,
the establishment in Later Han of the Trans-Liao command, with the appointment
of first and Acting and then a substantive General Who Crosses the Liao,
holding a garrison base at Manbo near modern Baotou but with responsibility for
active campaigning, introduced a composite form of military command.[1]
Like any sensible
administration, the Han government allocated broad areas of responsibility to
different types of officials, but did not insist upon a rigid distinction. Grand
administrators, for example, could be expected to lead troops in the field, and
in the centuries of Han many are recorded on active service, and even as
meeting death in battle. Moreover, on a wider scale than the commandery, the
inspectors of the provinces had definite responsibility for general defence
co-ordination and active leadership in time of serious trouble.
The development of the
province is an interesting aspect of the administrative history of Han. At the
beginning, the unit described normally as the circuit (bu), including a
number of commanderies and kingdoms, had an Inspector (cishi) appointed
to check upon the manner in which the grand administrators and chancellors
carried out their duties. The Inspector's rank was low, only 600 shi,
and he had no authority to take immediate action on any matter of civil
administration. He did however, have the right to report directly to the throne
and to set in train an investigation of malpractice. Moreover, in time of
disturbance within the territory of his supervision, if it was found that the
county and then commandery forces could not cope with the raiding, banditry or
rebellion, the inspector had the right and the duty to co-ordinate the levy of
an army from all the commanderies in the province and would often command this
force against the enemy.
Gradually, from Former through
Later Han, the importance of the provincial units increased, and in the closing
years of the dynasty, as disturbance became widespread throughout the empire,
the development reached its fulfilment with the appointment of Governors of
provinces (zhou mu), men of ministerial rank who thus held executive
authority over their subordinate commanderies. For the greater part of the
dynasty, however, this development was gradual, and the authority of an
inspector was generally uncertain.
On the other hand, in terms of
the frontier regions, with major military forces involved and a great extent of
territory to control, the province often served as a sensible strategic unit
for defence. Military commanders were not bound by the borders of civil
administration, and in times of major crises, as of invasion or internal
barbarian rebellion such as that of the Qiang in the early second century AD,
the provincial unit provided the effective scale to cope with the emergency. For
this reason, in the pages which follow, I describe the geography of the
northern frontier primarily in terms of the areas of the provinces.
Finally, however, one may emphasise once again the flexibility, and
even the vagueness, of Han administration along the frontier of the
north. The formal civilian administration is described by the histories
in terms of commanderies and counties, and there is certainly a clear
sense of distinction between regular local government and the campaigns
of major emergencies. On the other hand the maintenance of settled occupation
by Chinese people in the north was a practical problem which had to
be solved against a background of nomads beyond the frontier, indigenous
non-Chinese peoples within it, long-term garrisons and occasional expeditionary
forces, and a continuing need for local militia to defend their own
homes. In these circumstances, within the formal structure of imperial
administration, the Chinese government offered its officials the opportunity
to take appropriate action as the particular need arose in the long-term
strategy of survival.
Liang province
The Liang province of Later
Han was divided in two by the Yellow River, flowing eastwards from the Tibetan
massif and then north towards the desert land of the Ordos. In this region,
unlike other territories, the Yellow River was of only minor importance as a
communications route: its valley and its waters provide some opportunity for
travel upstream or down, but river transport is generally practicable only
during the high water of summer, and there were, in any case, few places of
interest or value along its course. On the contrary, in fact, in the time of
Qin and at the beginning of Former Han the Yellow River served as the frontier
line of the empire, and during later centuries it was a barrier to be overcome
for communication between China and central Asia.
According to Shi ji,
the Great Wall of the empire of Qin began at Lintao, in the valley of the Tao
River south of present-day Lanzhou, then ran north to the region of Lanzhou,
and then northeast below the Ordos. It was not until the time of Emperor Wu,
shortly before 100 BC, that the Han established a military and political
presence northwest across the Yellow River and founded the commanderies of Hexi
"West of the River". Jiuquan, Zhangye and Dunhuang were probably established
in 104 and subsequent years, Wuwei and Jincheng in the half-century following.
Under Later Han, the
commanderies of Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan and Dunhuang stretched in that order
from southeast to northwest along the present-day Gansu corridor. On the
southwest, they were backed by the Qilian Shan and the mountainous region of
present-day Qinghai. To the north and east they faced the Helan Shan, the Tengger
and other deserts on the edges of the Gobi. The cities and settlements were
based on oases, supplied by the snowmelt streams which flow from the high
ground to the south and then disappear into marshes in the desert. As in the
Tarim basin of central Asia, irrigation agriculture was maintained around these
cities, and the settled farming economy was sufficient to provide a frontier
defence for the trade and communications of the Silk Road which led through the
Western Regions to India and Rome.
This region of the Gansu
corridor was not necessarily and naturally the base for an agricultural economy.
It had formerly been taken over from chieftains of Xiongnu states, whose people
had no doubt found adequate grazing grounds and pastures among the marshes and
along the rivers of this territory. Though the military presence of Han was
reinforced by agricultural colonies and settlements, the water supply of the
rivers today is still changeable, and ruins in the desert testify to the loss
of oases and the need for new settlement elsewhere. The maintenance of Chinese
colonisation during the Han period was by no means impossible, but it required
constant effort and care.
In one part of this region,
now known by the Mongol name of Edsin Gol, the Ruo Shui flows past the present
city of Jiuquan for more than three hundred kilometres into the desert. Nowadays,
the Edsin Gol provides little more than brackish water and salt pans, but in
the time of Han these marshes were fertile, and abundant with wild life. The
whole river system then provided a salient of arable land stretching into the
heart of the desert.
This territory, called Juyan
by the Han Chinese, was maintained and garrisoned by the empire from the time
of Emperor Wu until the last century of Later Han. Militarily, the outpost of
the Great Wall was important for two reasons: as a supply point for the garrisons
in the northwest and, perhaps more significant, as a means to deny this
prosperous region to the northern nomads. Left undefended, Juyan would have
provided an ideal route for attack against the Chinese commanderies of the
corridor itself.
During Former Han, therefore,
the Zhelu Zhang (Fortress to Block the Enemy), had been constructed by the
marshes of the Edsin Gol, and it was from this base, for example, that the
general Li Ling went forth on his disastrous attack against the Xiongnu in 99
BC.
South of the Juyan salient,
the main line of defences followed the Great Wall, which ran in this region
from the passes of Yumen Guan and Yang Guan in Dunhuang commandery of the far
west along the northern edge of the Gansu corridor past Jiuquan, Zhangye and Wuwei.
The commandery of Wuwei also
extended a salient to the north, less marked than that of Juyan, but also
presenting a forward defence and a frontier pass to the steppe and desert. This
area of Chinese control was based upon the river system of the Shiyang He in
the region of modern Minqin.
Between these two more
advanced positions, along and probably outside the Great Wall, the Dependent
State of Zhangye extended a series of military posts over marginal land.
The garrisons of the
watchtowers on the Wall were supported by civilian farming and by military
agricultural colonies (tuntian). Behind this line of fortifications, the
government of Han was able to maintain its settlements and its communications
to the Western Regions, in central Asia, generally secure from attacks from the
north. In the other direction, the high ground of the Qinghai and Qilian Shan,
and the limited political organisation of the hill people, required no such
scale of protection. Raids are recorded, but for the most part the walls of the
Chinese cities and settlements were adequate for defence or deterrence.
In many respects, despite the
strategic importance of the Gansu corridor, it was not a territory which
presented great military difficulty to the Han dynasty. So long as the defences
were properly maintained, the mountains on one side and the desert on the other
restricted the risk of serious attack, and the local population of the region,
largely Chinese settlers, had small reason or opportunity to cause trouble to
their government. The problems of dealing with non-Chinese people arose rather
in the south and east, among the broken ground of the Yellow River and its
tributaries.
It is not certain where the
Silk Road from China crossed the Yellow River during Han times, but it was surely
in the region of present-day Lanzhou; and this frontier place of early Han
became the base for expansion to the west of the river. The commandery of
Jincheng was not formally established until 81 BC, but administrative and
political control had been maintained for a generation before that time, based
notably upon the garrison city of Lianju, on the Datong River, about a hundred
kilometres northwest of present-day Lanzhou.
Unlike the Gansu corridor,
however, the landform of this territory provides more than a simple
communications route to the northwest. A short distance upstream from Lanzhou,
the Yellow River is joined from the south by the Daxia and Tao rivers, and from
the northwest by the Huang Shui, or Xining River. The two southern rivers flow
through hill country and the lower edges of the Qinghai massif, and
comparatively speaking, communication across the watershed from the Tao River
valley eastwards to the upper reaches of the Wei is not particularly difficult.
So the Tao and Daxia valleys were incorporated as frontier territories into the
empire, and although the Han government does not appear to have maintained the
wall defences established by Qin, there was small need or opportunity for
expansion into the high ground along the upper reaches of the Yellow River to
the east. By and large it appears that the imperial frontier followed the
general line of the present administrative boundary between Gansu and Qinghai.
North of the Yellow River,
however, the Xining valley presented a different situation. The Xining River
has its source near the closed salt lake of Koko Nor, or Qing Hai, from which
the whole modern region gets its name. It flows generally east to join the
Yellow River, and shortly before that junction it is joined from the north by
the Datong River.
The upper reaches of the
Xining River were of no significance for the communications route of the Silk
Road, which probably followed the Zhuanglang River from the crossing of the
Yellow River close to the line of the present railroad, with the fortress of
Lianju as a guard on the west. Further west, the Xining Valley is generally
narrow between the mountains, but there is fertile, cultivable ground along the
river. For the Chinese, this region, like Edsin Gol, provided economic
advantage to their control, and it was also a territory which could be
dangerous if left unattended. Non-Chinese peoples might find here the opportunity
for political association and could become a coherent threat against imperial
positions on the Yellow River.
The establishment of Jincheng
commandery, therefore, served two purposes: firstly as a base for the
communications line across the Yellow River which led north through Wuwei and
into central Asia; second as an area for colonisation by the Chinese, north of
the Yellow River and in the Xining valley.
So far, the discussion of
Liang province has been concerned with those areas which were the subject of
expansion and settlement the time of Emperor Wu of Former Han. The eastern part
of the province, however, was territory which had for the most part been
controlled by the government of the Qin state and empire in the third century
BC.
Under Qin, the greater part of
this region was administered by Longxi commandery, so named from its position
west of Long Mountain, a southern peak of the Liupan Shan, on the border of
present-day Gansu and Shenxi provinces. In geographical terms, the term
"West of Long Mountain" describes all the valley of the upper Wei,
being the bulk of the eastern part of present-day Gansu.
Under the arrangements of
Emperor Wu of Han, the commandery of Tianshui was established to control the
Wei valley immediately west of Long Mountain, and the rump of Longxi commandery
governed only the frontier territory of the Tao River and the further part of
the Wei valley. South of the Wei and the Tao was Wudu commandery, which had
been in Yi circuit under Former Han but was in Liang province of later Han. The
commandery covered the mountainous country of the Min Shan in present-day
southern Gansu and the borders of Sichuan, with the upper course of the Han
River and of the Bailong Jiang. In this region also, both the non-Chinese and
the Chinese settlements were scattered and isolated among the mountains at the
foothills of Tibet and the base of the great ridge of the Qin Ling.
Wudu commandery did not
contain a good communications route from north to south. The main access from
the Wei River through the Qin Ling to present-day Sichuan was the celebrated
Baoye Road, which wound its way south from Mei county in Youfufeng, up the Ye
River tributary of the Wei, across the Taibai Shan and into the valley of the
Bao River, tributary of the upper Han, with terminus at Baozhong in Hanzhong
commandery. A second, older road, the Lianyun or "Linked Cloud" Road,
which lay east of the Baoye, ran south from Chencang county, in the region of
present-day Fengxian in Shenxi, and then across the watershed to the region of
present-day Liuba, again on the Bao River above Baozhong.
These two roads, and various
minor and more difficult routes, are remarkable examples of engineering skill
and ingenuity, with galleries cut into the cliffs and escarpments, and trestles
built out over the ravines. Though Gudao on the Linked Cloud Road was actually
administered as part of Wudu commandery, these lines of communication and
transport were designed to connect the lower Wei valley, being the region about
Chang'an, with the upper course of the Han River. They climbed, therefore,
through the ranges of present-day southern Shenxi, and most of Wudu commandery,
in present-day southern Gansu, was a somewhat isolated frontier territory, with
its axis along the ridges and among the valleys of the headwaters of the Han
River and the Tao.
The main communications route
east and west along the Wei River was the Long Road, so called from the
mountain by which it passed. It seems probable that the ancient road generally
followed the line of the modern railway from Xi'an along the Wei valley, then
crossed the watershed to the Tao River, and then went north to the Yellow River
near Lanzhou, where it joined the Silk Road leading northwest into central
Asia. Most of eastern Gansu is rolling loess hills, not a major obstruction to
open movement and manoeuvre, but sufficient to render attractive the silted
flood-plains of the major streams, while in the upper reaches of the Wei and
about the Yellow River the terrain is steep enough to make travel away from the
valleys quite difficult.
Near Long Mountain, however,
on the borders of present-day Gansu and Shenxi, the Wei River runs through
gorges in the loess. In this region the Han road left the Wei Valley and
crossed the hill country through the Long Pass, north of the river. The Pass
was a fortified barrier, and the Long Road itself was protected as a military
highway, with patrols, garrisons, stores and arsenals at intervals along its
course.
North of the Wei, the various
valleys of its tributaries west of Liupan Shan were controlled by Tianshui
commandery, renamed Hanyang in 74 AD, while the small river valleys which
joined the Yellow River further north and across the narrow watershed were
administered by Wuwei. Some peaks of the Liupan Shan and its northern extension
the Quwu Shan may rise above 2500 metres, but the ground is comparatively open,
with a number of broad valleys, and good possibility of herding and movement.
In one respect the country was
markedly different to the present. In southern Shenxi, the Qin Ling is still
covered by forests, but the Wei valley and its tributaries once contained
extensive areas of marshland, and the hill country of Long Mountain and the
north were also timbered. Now the marshes are almost entirely channelled and
drained, and the hill slopes have been extensively deforested and terraced. In
time of Han, the colonisation of Liang province was not fully complete, and
there were certainly areas where marshland provided an obstacle to
communications. We are told, moreover, that the commanderies of Tianshui and
Longxi were noted for their mountains and forests, and it seems certain that the
timbered country of the Qin Ling extended northwards across the Wei, thinning
gradually until it petered out in the grasslands of the steppes south of the
Ordos.
The development of
administrative geography in this region of Liang province reflects a process of
amendment to the original scheme of Qin and early Han. With its power base on
the lower valley of the Wei, as the government of Qin expanded west and north
it radiated its administrative control outwards like the arcs of a circle. On
the west, Longxi commandery of Qin had been based on the upper valley of the
Wei just beyond the Long Pass, and from that advanced base Qin authority had
expanded to the valley of the Tao River and the course of the Yellow River
further north. In later generations, as Chinese control became firm and the
population under its authority increased, the original units of expansion were
divided up into smaller areas, so that Tianshui/Hanyang and Wudu commanderies
were established from part of the territory of Longxi.
The process was a long one,
and it cannot be suggested that the government of Han was instantly responsive
to changes in the balance. There was, however, a dynamic to the government of
the frontier provinces, with power expressed by communication routes from the
settled hinterland to the more uncertain borders. At the same time, it was
essential both that the borders should not be too far extended and that the
hinterland should remain settled and secure.
To the north of the Wei, two
further commanderies were included in Liang province. Anding and Beidi had been
based upon what is now the easternmost part of Gansu province, east of the Liupan
Shan, extending over the greater part of this drainage basin which forms the
Jing River. The Jing is a tributary of the lower Wei, gathering water from a
broad open valley and then passing through a ridge of hills northwest of
present-day Xi'an. Under the Han dynasty these hills, known as the Qian Shan,
marked the border between Liang province and the imperial capital district
about Chang'an. In modern times, they separate Shenxi province from the extreme
eastern section of Gansu.
In Former Han, Anding and
Beidi had controlled a pattern of Chinese settlements which extended northwest
from the Jing River to the Yellow River near present-day Yinchuan in Ningxia. Like
Wuwei to the east, and the long line of the Edsin Gol, the area of Yinchuan may
be seen as an outpost of fertile, irrigable agricultural farmland among the dry
lands of desert and steppe. In Tang times this territory was an important
centre of communications, and it had long been settled by the Chinese under Qin
and Han. During Later Han, however, though the territories of the commanderies
still reached the Yellow River, there were fewer county cities and control was
less effective.
Two counties in the west of
Former Han Anding had been transferred by Later Han to the territory of Wuwei,
and Anding was now restricted to the east of the Quwu range, north of the Liupan
Shan. Here the county of Sanshui extended over the valley of the Qingshui He. Sanshui
was also the headquarters of the Dependent State of Anding, an expedient to
extend the authority of a potentially over-stretched county administration.
North and east of Anding,
Beidi commandery had suffered a similar fate. Its territory still extended from
the valley of the Jing to the Yellow River, but most of the region between was
under the single county of Lingzhou, whose city was in the neighbourhood of
present-day Yinchuan. Many other counties had been abolished, and the capital,
Fuping, which under Former Han had been close to modern Yinchuan, was shifted
south by Later Han to the neighbourhood of Jingyang in Gansu.
In this region, therefore, in the lands on the southern fringe of the
Ordos, the expansion of Former Han had been largely halted by a combination
of political, economic and ultimately geographical factors. As in other
regions to the north and east, the frontier position of Later Han was
not equal to that of its predecessor.
A note on the question of climate
At this point we should
consider the fact that the form of the land and the potential fertility of the
soil are of almost secondary importance compared to questions of rainfall and
temperature. Like all of China, this region of the northwest is affected by the
annual monsoon alternation of air movement; with warm wet summers from the
south influenced by the seasonal continental low pressure region, and cold dry
winters from the great high pressure region which forms over Mongolia.
At the present time, Lanzhou
and most of Gansu province lie close to the line of 250 millimetres [10 inches]
annual rainfall, and the minimum average temperature in January reaches about
-5c, so that only 150 to 200 days of the year are free from frost. Under
these conditions, wheat and quick-growing grains such as millet and barley can
be sown in spring for harvest in autumn. Slightly further south, near present
day Xi'an, a small increase in annual precipitation and a somewhat milder
winter allow for the planting of wheat in winter for harvesting in mid-year,
followed again by millet, barley or other crops.
The Wei valley about Xi'an,
however, is recognised as a region with local climate offering more favourable
conditions for agriculture: at the present day, the Wei valley is the furthest place
north of the Qin Ling dividing range which will support the growing of bamboo,
a generally tropical plant. It was, indeed, the very fertility of this region
which made it the key economic area for the dominance of north China first by
Qin and then by Former Han.
It is impossible to assess,
with any degree of precision, the details of the climate of north China during
Han. There are interesting accounts in literature, and specific records of
droughts and floods have been preserved in the histories. These, however, are isolated
items, related only to one particular place or time, and dangerous as the basis
for generalisation: it is, for example, remarkably difficult to judge whether a
reference to a drought, or even a series of droughts over several years, is the
indication of a gradual change in climate or rather a local phenomenon,
indicating reasonable but unfulfilled expectations of satisfactory rainfall; and
the drought itself may have been reported to the court more for the political
value of the portent than as an item of practical concern.
The Chinese scholar Zhu Kezhen,
in an article published in 1972, assesses literary and historical records of
plants growing in particular regions, and compares his judgements with the
climate indicators found in oxygen isotope profiles from drill cores in the
Greenland ice sheet. There is an impressive general correlation between Zhu's
reconstructions and the evidence from Greenland, and until there are published
results of detailed research from physical sources in China, Professor Zhu's
work is the best general outline that we have.
Zhu's reconstruction for the
Qin and Han period suggests that in the third and second centuries BC the
climate of north China was generally more temperate than today, with an earlier
spring and with bamboo well established in the region of present-day Henan
province. From that time, however, the climate gradually became colder, with a
low point about the beginning of Later Han, early in the first century AD, a
slight improvement at the end of the first and the beginning of the second
century, and then another cold spell leading to the Three Kingdoms period and
the Jin. It may be estimated that the overall temperature of China may have
fallen 1 or 2 degrees below the present.
It is a tempting speculation
to link the decline of Former Han, and the Later Han shift of the capital from Chang'an
to Luoyang, to the effect of the gradual cold and dry change of the climate. In
our present state of knowledge, however, the temptation must be resisted. Even
apart from the general uncertainty of calculations about the climate, there
were many other factors, political, personal and military, which determined the
shifts of power within the Chinese world from one generation to another.
It should be noted, moreover,
that there is no evidence for any major, catastrophic change in the climate of
China over the past two thousand years. Such variations as there have been, in
rainfall and in temperature, have been incremental one way or another, and
though the effect of such changes may have serious local consequences,
particularly when change is compounded by mistaken efforts of man, it is
present scientific opinion that the climate of north China during Han was
similar to that of today.
From the point of view of frontier history, however, what must be recognised
is that the greater part of the northern provinces of Han lay along
the margin of agriculture and the pastoral economy. With the aid of
water control and storage to provide irrigation for the more level ground
of the river valleys, the farmers of Han, like their counterparts today,
could harvest their crops and maintain their way of life, while further
out, on the open hillsides, other people grazed their flocks and herds.
These provinces along the northern frontier of the empire provided the
conditions for a mixed economy on the margins of settlement, and in
such circumstances a comparatively slight or short-term change in the
pattern of rainfall and temperature could have important consequences.
Bing province
North of the Wei River below
Xi'an, present-day Shenxi controls the wide valley of the Luo River and its
tributaries. The Luo also flows south to join the Wei River, very close to the
Wei's own junction with the Yellow River at its great bend. Unlike the Jing
River, however, the other major tributary of the lower Wei, the Luo appears
rather as a main stream with numerous tributaries than as a complex of minor
streams across a broad basin. At the head of the valley, the watershed of the Baiyu
Shan separates the upper reaches of the Luo from the Wuding and other
tributaries of the Yellow River on the northeast, and from the steppe and
desert of the Ordos region to the northwest.
In the region of the Wei
valley, the lower course of the Luo during Later Han was controlled by the
capital commandery of Zuopingyi in Sili province, but the middle and upper
reaches of the valley were under Shang commandery, and the territory of that
commandery, a Qin dynasty foundation, extended north to include most of northern
Shenxi and to exercise at least nominal responsibility for the south of the
Ordos.
Under the Qin dynasty, the
Direct Road (zhi dao) led from the imperial capital at Xianyang to the
outlying frontier posts of Jiuyuan commandery on the northern loop of the
Yellow River. The road ran from Ganquan, site of a great detached palace of the
First Emperor, due north along the ridge of the Ziwu Ling ranges, across the Baiyu
Shan and then north through the centre of the Ordos to reach and cross the
Yellow River by present-day Baotou in Inner Mongolia. It was a remarkable feat
of construction by the celebrated general Meng Tian, builder of the Great Wall
of Qin, and it confirmed the authority of the Chinese empire along the furthest
reach of the Yellow River. In the century which followed the fall of Qin,
however, those distant territories were lost to Chinese control, and it was not
until the time of Emperor Wu that the empire returned to the north.
As the Han commanderies of
Wuyuan and Shuofang were established along the northern loop of the Yellow
River in 127 BC, Shang commandery provided the main route of access. The North
Road of Han, however, did not take the direct line of the Qin: it appears
rather to have followed the Luo valley, crossed the watershed north past
present-day Yan'an, then followed the Wuding River past Fushi, the capital of
the commandery, and north through the Great Wall at Yulin. From there, a motor
road now runs north through the desert to Dongsheng and on to Baotou. The Han
road was not such a spectacular feat of military engineering as that of Qin,
but it also assisted the administration of Shang commandery itself, and it
provided a less exposed route for regular communications.
North of the Wuding River and
east of the North Road of Han, the tributary streams and valleys of the Yellow
River in the area of present-day Shenmu formed part of the territory of Xihe
commandery. Half of that commandery lay on the eastern bank of the Yellow
River, but until 140 AD the capital of Xihi was at Pingding, probably on the
North Road near present-day Dongsheng in Inner Mongolia. Rather more
importantly, during Later Han the city of Meiji, close to the Yellow River near
present-day Fugu in Shenxi, was the enforced capital of the Shanyu of the
Southern Xiongnu, tributary and hostage to Han.
Beyond this region of desert
and steppe, then, lay the northern loop of the Yellow River. At the east, where
a number of rivers meander together across open irrigated ground, there was the
frontier commandery of Yunzhong, with its capital, a city of the same name,
near present-day Togtoh, and the territory of the commandery extended eastwards
beyond Huhhot, now the capital of Inner Mongolia. That city, in fact, dates its
history only from the Ming dynasty, but there were Han settlements in the
region, and the main road through the Daqing mountains at present-day Wuchuan
was guarded by the Great Wall.
To the west of Yunzhong,
upstream along this northern reach of the Yellow River, were the commanderies
of Wuyuan and Shuofang. In this region of steppe and desert the identification
of ancient sites is not always certain, but it seems probable that Wuyuan
commandery controlled the middle of this stretch of the river, and its capital,
Jiuyuan, was close to present-day Baotou. The territory of Shuofang embraced
the complex of streams and meanders at the west of the loop of the Yellow
River, and the capital, Linrong, was within the loop of the main stream,
northeast of present-day Dengkou, or Bayan Gol.[2]
In this region, there have been
significant geographical changes. As a result of explorations on the ground
during the early 1960s, Professor Hou Renzhi of Beijing University was able to
identify the site of the Han cities of Linrong and Sanfeng, with their
attendant fortifications, in the desert near Dengkou, and he has also
reconstructed the ancient course of the Yellow River, as described by Shuijing
zhu.[3]
At the present day, the Yellow
River flows past Dengkou on the east, and its course traces a gentle curve
north-eastwards. During Han times, however, the river lay to the west of the
present site of Dengkou, and its line was more directly to the north. The
ancient site of Linrong, some thirty kilometres northeast of Dengkou, is now on
the western bank of the Yellow River, but it was then a considerable distance
east of the stream. A little to the north of Linrong, the ancient course of the
Yellow River divided into two, in much the same fashion as it does today. The
main channel follows a shorter curve to the south, but the secondary, outer
loop, with its attendant streams, defines a wide area known in Han as the Beijia,
forming an important part of the territory of Shuofang commandery.
However, besides this
reconciliation of Shuijing zhu with the modern map, Professor Hou has
demonstrated a far more dramatic change in the country. According to Shuijing
zhu, to the north of Sanfeng, on the west of the Yellow River, there was a
great marsh and lake called Chushen ze. This can be identified in the
present day, but the whole area is now a desert of sand-hills and rock, useless
for agriculture or for grazing, and totally changed from the fertile oasis of
two thousand years ago. Modern Dengkou is a small settlement, with a few
patches of irrigated ground along the Yellow River, while a short distance to
the south the railway crosses from the west bank to the east, just to avoid the
shifting dunes which cover the whole western bank and flow directly into the
river itself.
For a hundred and fifty
kilometres from Dengkou south to Shizuishan, north of Yinchuan, the Yellow
River flows between the high ground of the Ordos on the east and the desert
mountains of the Helan Shan on the west. On one side, the Ordos slopes
gradually eastwards, with scattered salt lakes across the middle; but nowhere
is it hospitable. In the other direction, the Tengger Desert, which includes
the Helan Shan, is a southern extension of the Gobi between the Yellow River
and the Gansu corridor. This region has less than 100 mm [4inches] annual
rainfall, and though there are scattered lakes and oases there is no
practicable opportunity for settled agriculture or even proper grazing.
It was, of course, possible to
traverse the desert region: there were occasions when the Han maintained communications
direct from Shuofang to Juyan, and some fortified posts were set up and manned.
At other times, the northern nomads are described as coming south through the
desert to trade or to attack the Han positions or those of their allies in the
Ordos region, or the frontier of Wuwei commandery further west. For the most
part, however, the main paths of communication between the Chinese empire and
the north lay through Juyan and the Wuwei salient or through the various passes
of Shuofang and Wuyuan.
It seems, then, most likely
that during the Han period the area about Sanfeng marked the end of a section
of the Great Wall. We are told explicitly that the Han fortifications,
re-established along the northern part of the Ordos loop after the conquests of
the general Wei Qing in 127, followed the Qin system of defences that had been
set up by Meng Tian, and those fortifications had guarded the line of the Yin
Shan, from the pass at Gaoque, north of Shuofang, through Wuyuan and Yunzhong
commanderies eastwards. In this way, the campaigns of Emperor Wu reconquered
the irrigable lands north of the Ordos and restored the spur of defences which
protected that territory from the steppe.
South of Shuofang, along the
west of the Ordos loop to the region of present-day Yinchuan, the frontier was
marked perhaps only by occasional patrols and watch-posts, not by a continuous
defensive system. Moreover, it appears that the Qin dynasty, and Former Han
after it, had maintained a second line, the old wall of the Qin state. Shi
ji describes the defence line completed by Meng Tian as running from
Lintao to Liaodong, with an additional spur to guard the north of the Yellow
River: the main line of the old Qin Wall was therefore in the south of the
Ordos, northeast from present-day Lanzhou and along the borders of modern Shenxi
province. During the early part of Former Han, until the conquest of the north
by the armies of Emperor Wu, this southern Qin wall was the front line of
Chinese defence, and even during Later Han there is occasional reference to the
old fortification.
At the present day, the south
of the Ordos, along the northern borders of Shenxi and east of Yinchuan, is
another wilderness of drifting sand dunes and desert. Like the region of Sanfeng
in Shuofang, however, the land was not always so desolate. In the fifth century
AD, the chieftain Helian Bobo, founder of the short-lived Xia state, set his
capital in this territory, and records of the time describe the place as an
open, grassy steppe, ideal for the centre of power of a nomad empire. The ruins
of the ancient settlement can still be identified, but they are now surrounded
by a waste of sand.
Though the steppe of this
region in Later Han still provided suitable grazing land, it appears that
attempts to establish full Chinese-style settlement had largely failed. We have
observed how Anding and Beidi of Liang province relied on isolated counties to
cover broad areas of territory southeast of the Yellow River and southwest of
the Ordos. In similar fashion, the Later Han establishments of Qiuci Dependant
State and Houguan, both, it would appear, with a military component in their
administration, were designed to cover broad areas of territory in a loose
supervision of the nomad tributaries of the empire. The intensive and ambitious
colonisation pattern of Former Han had largely been dismantled.
This was a deliberate policy
of Later Han, begun by the founding Emperor Guangwu in the early days of his
government. It was at once a policy of economy and also probably a recognition
that the colonisation of the frontiers was overextended in the geographical and
military circumstances of the time.
Similar withdrawal and
reduction of the imperial presence may be observed elsewhere in the north and
northwest. As a result, though the northern frontier of Later Han generally
followed the line of Former Han, there was far less energetic occupation of the
ground by the people and by the civil administration. In the history which
follows, one may observe some of the reasons and results of this policy.
In the immediate area we are
considering, the central desert of the Ordos, fringed by abroad belt of arable
steppe, long represented a barrier and offered a choice to the rulers of China.
With a conservative policy, the line of the old Wall of the Qin state along the
southern edge of the Ordos could be held in defence of the heart of the empire
about Chang'an and Luoyang. In contrast, the First Emperor of Qin and Emperor
Wu of Han adopted a "forward" policy, establishing Chinese
settlements along the northern loop of the Yellow River. The colonies were
designed to serve as an advanced defence line against the northern tribes,
depriving them of the benefits of the irrigated land, and holding them back
from any secure position within reach of the heartlands of the empire.
Each choice presented
problems: if the frontier line was south of the Ordos, the people of the steppe
could establish a political or military force which would pose a continual
threat to the valleys of the Luo and the Jing, and to the territory about the
imperial capital itself. If the Chinese committed themselves to the far north, however,
though they gained increased security in the south, there were problems of
military maintenance and supply. By force of nature, that northern land was a
true frontier territory, dangerous to abandon and yet difficult to hold. The
dilemma of policy remained with the Han government throughout its history.
So far, however, the problem
has been considered in terms of a north-south axis, across the Ordos: the
eastern part of Bing province gave a different slant to Han strategy.
Though Meng Tian of Qin had
conquered the lands of the northern loop of the Yellow River, the first Chinese
military occupation of that region was accomplished by the state of Zhao,
northernmost of the three successors to the divided state of Jin, about 300 BC.
The base of the state of Zhao
lay in the northern part of present-day Shenxi, and we are told in Shi ji
that King Wuling of Zhao adopted the clothing style and many of the customs of
the northern peoples. During the course of his reign, he extended his kingdom
to the north, founded the commanderies of Dai, Yanmen and Yunzhong, and
constructed a defensive wall along the Yin Shan range westwards to Gaoque.
From this perspective, the
defence of the northern loop of the Yellow River was a means to protect Chinese
positions in the north of present-day Shenxi. The conquest by Meng Tian of Qin
marked a re-establishment of the position formerly maintained by the state of
Zhao, and the later expansion by Emperor Wu of Han into the same region was
again designed as much to support the northern territories of Dai, Yanmen and
Yunzhong as to protect the lands south of the Ordos. It was, in fact, a natural
corollary of the Chinese occupation of the region about Togtoh and Huhhot that
they should attempt to deny their nomad enemies the land immediately west of
that position.
Present-day Shanxi was largely
controlled by Bing province of Later Han. In the southwest, the Han commandery
of Hedong, part of the administration of the capital province Sili, governed
the lower reaches of the Fen River and the northern bank of the Yellow River,
extending into present-day Henan, but the commandery of Taiyuan in Bing
province, centred upon the site of the present-day Taiyuan city, occupied the
upper valley of the Fen, and immediately to the south of Taiyuan, the
commandery of Shangdang extended westwards from the Taihang Shan, and included
the upper basins of the Qin River and the Zhuozhang. From this base within
China proper the northern commanderies of Bing province reached into
present-day Inner Mongolia.
Under the Han dynasty, a major
highway had been constructed northeast from Chang'an, across the Yellow River,
up the valley of the Fen to Taiyuan, then through the mountains to the North
China Plain. In similar fashion, though on a provincial scale, the lines of
communication to the northern frontier followed the Fen River and the upper
reaches of the Sanggan River past present-day Datong.
A stretch of the Ming Great
Wall follows the line of the Heng Shan, above the upper waters of the Fen,
while on the west, between the Fen River and the southwards course of the
Yellow River, the Guancen Shan and the Liang Shan are inhospitable territory,
which in the Han period was probably uncolonised. Thus the watershed of the
Heng Shan and the ridge of the Guancen Shan formed a strategic division between
the southern commanderies of Bing province and the north.
Yamen commandery was based on
the upper Sanggan valley about present-day Datong, and its territory extended
northwards. To the west, Yunzhong commandery was based upon the open valley of
the Dahei River in the region of modern Huhhot and Togtoh, while the small
commandery of Dingxiang, which in Former Han had also guarded a section of the
frontier, was compressed during Later Han into the general area of the Hun
River and the northern foothills of the Guancen Shan, on the border of
present-day Shenxi province with Inner Mongolia.
The city of Datong was the
site of the capital of Northern Wei during the fifth century AD, and it was
also a political centre of the Liao and Jin dynasties, contemporary with
Northern and Southern Song at the beginning of our millennium. With rainfall
about 300 mm, or 12 inches, per year, the territory is marginal between farmland
and grazing country. The hills now are bare, a result of the desperate
deforestation of recent centuries, but Shi ji states that in the
north of the pre-Han state of Jin there were Forest Barbarians, and it appears
that the Dai Forest, a sacred site of the Xiongnu, was in the area which later
became the Mayi county of Yanmen commandery of Han.
In the period up to the Han
dynasty, therefore, this region of northern Shanxi and Inner Mongolia lay on
the frontier between China and the barbarians, and it was the political
expansion of the Warring States, and of the Qin and Han dynasties which
followed them, that incorporated the territory generally into the Chinese
sphere of government.
North from Datong, the
railroad to Jining in Inner Mongolia lies for the most part through open
valley, with gentle hills. From Jining one line extends north-eastwards, to Ulaanbaatar
in the Mongolian People's Republic, but another goes west, south of the Daqing
Mountains, through Huhhot and on to the Ordos loop of the Yellow River. The Dahei
valley is broad and easy to irrigate, and opens in a delta where it nears the
Yellow River. The mountains to the north, however, high though not very steep,
mark the beginning of the grasslands, with low rainfall, cold winters and a
short growing period, and a vast expanse of open country. The steppe provides
excellent pasture, with moisture both from the occasional rain and from the
snows of winter, and the country supports great herds of cattle and sheep, as
well as the horses, camels and other animals useful to the herdsmen. It is not,
however, a region where effective settle agriculture is possible by traditional
methods using pre-modern equipment.
As a result, the Sanggan
valley and the Dahei valley of northern Shenxi and Inner Mongolia are
transitional between farmland and steppe, and the balance of nature has changed
only very slightly through slight variations of climate and the activities of
men. It was primarily a matter of political will and military strength that set
the Great Wall frontier of Han along the high ground of the Yin Shan and the Daqing
Shan, and both will and strength were liable to fluctuation and change.
In this region, however, though there was, as we shall see, considerable
loss of Chinese settlement, the frontier of Later Han followed essentially
the same line as that of Former Han.
You Province
East of Yanmen in Bing
province, the Later Han commanderies of Dai and Shanggu occupied the middle
basin of the Sanggan River. As in the region about Datong, the terrain is
generally open separated from the North China Plain by the ridges of the
Taihang Shan to the south and from the northern steppe by the Damaqun Shan. The
modern railroad follows the Yang River tributary of the Sanggan, along the
northern part of the basin, past Yanggao, close to the site of ancient Gaoliu,
chief county of Dai commandery.
It is probable that the Great
Wall of Han in this region followed the line of the later Ming, along the lower
reaches of the Damaqun Shan. We know that Ning city near modern Zhangjiakou, or
Kalgan, was the headquarters of the Colonel Protector of the Wuhuan and a
centre for trading with the northern barbarians, so there was evidently a
significant communications route leading north through the mountains.
Like the territories about
present-day Huhhot and Datong, however, this region of the Sanggan was also
marginal ground, and in the first years of Later Han the whole region had
fallen under the sway of the Xiongnu. The line of hills to the south then
became the effective frontier of the empire, and the Feihu, or Flying Fox,
pass, in the Taihang Shan north of Laiyuan in Hebei, and the Juyong Pass, now
incorporated into the present-day Great Wall at Badaling northwest of Beijing,
were two major defence posts.
During the reconstruction
which followed the recovery of this region in the middle of the first century
AD, Shanggu commandery, which had formerly extended south of the Juyong Pass,
was re-established entirely in the north, while the small commandery of
Guangyang, in the area about present-day Beijing, and Zhuo commandery, to the
southwest, controlled the southern approaches. East of Guangyang and Shanggu,
reaching from present-day Tianjin north to the frontier, was Yuyang commandery,
and east of Yuyang was Youbeiping.
In this region, northeast of
the North China Plain, the frontier of the empire changed significantly between
Former and Later Han. During Former Han, the territory of Yuyang had extended
northwards to the west of Chengde, beyond the line of the Ming Great Wall in
the northeast of modern Hebei province. Similarly, Youbeiping had controlled a
stretch of territory from the northern shore of the Gulf of Bohai about Tangshan,
up the valley of the Luan He through the Yan Shan range, and into the region of
Chengde. Indeed, during Former Han, the capital of Youbeiping commandery was at
Pinggang, near present-day Pingquan east of Chengde.
While the other frontier
territories of Former Han were re-occupied by Later Han, however, the upper
basin of the Luan about Chengde was abandoned. The three northern counties of
Yuyang disappeared, and Youbeiping was reduced from sixteen counties in Former
Han to four in Later Han. Some of this reduction represented the disestablishment
of counties with small population in the south of the commandery, but a
significant number reflected the withdrawal from the Chengde Region.
The fortifications of Later
Han, therefore, now followed the foothills of the high ground immediately to
the north of the North China Plain, and the territory of the empire was
restricted to the low-lying ground between the Yan Shan and the marshland of
the sea-coast: at that time, moreover, the coastal strip was narrower than it
is now, for two thousand years of siltation has extended the land considerably.
From Youbeiping an imperial
highway followed the coast north-eastwards, past Shanhaiguan at the end of the
Great Wall of Ming, and along the strip of land between the Song Ling range and
the sea to the Chinese-controlled territories of southern Manchuria and Korea. During
Han, this line of communication was controlled by Liaoxi commandery, which
extended to the region of present-day Jinzhou in Liaoning.
The administrative and
military geography of the northeast during Han times has been the subject of
some debate and many questions remain unsettled. It does not appear that Later
Han made any attempt to maintain a full line of fortifications among the Song
Ling mountains. Instead, some frontier position was maintained in the valley of
the Daling He, known as the Bolang He, "White Wolf River", which runs
between the Song Ling and the parallel ridge of the Nuluerhu Shan further
inland, then curves to enter the Gulf of Liaodong east of Jinzhou. By
controlling at least part of this rugged country, the Han was able to maintain
a reasonable security from the hill and forest tribes of the frontier; on the
other hand, the special problems of the frontier in this area were recognised
by the government of Emperor An, with the re-organisation of three counties of
Liaoxi and three counties of Liaodong commanderies into the Dependent State of
Liaodong.[4]
The remaining commanderies of the northeast of Later Han, Xuantu and
Lelang, are of limited interest to this study, and the dealings of the
Han empire with the non-Chinese peoples of this region, southern Manchuria
and Korea, have been considered by other scholars. In general, it appears
that the commandery of Liaodong in Later Han controlled the lower reaches
of the Liao River and the open country of the south Manchurian plain,
while Lelang preserved some part of the former Han authority over the
southeast of present-day Liaoning and the north-western part of Korea.
Xuantu, north-east of present-day Shenyang, faced with mixed success
the turbulent and increasingly aggressive kingdom of Koguryo, or Gaogouli.
But dealings with Korea and Manchuria were in some respects a sideshow
to the pressing problems with which the Han government had to contend
on the northern frontiers of China Proper: as in central Asia, the power
of China on this distant borderland depended ultimately upon the power
of the Chinese government in its own territory close to home. The real
problem for Later Han lay with the barbarian Qiang, Xiongnu, Wuhuan
and Xianbi, and it is with those peoples, and the policies and practice
of the imperial government towards them, that the present work must
deal.
The lands beyond the frontier
The two geographical regions
of Manchuria and Mongolia are separated by the mountain country if the Great Xing'an
range, which extends a ridge from present-day Heilongjiang province of northern
Manchuria southwards along the western parts of Jilin and Liaoning. To the
north, the watershed marks the international border of china with the Soviet
Union and with the Mongolian People's Republic, and in the south it provides
the boundary between Liaoning province and the Autonomous Region of Inner
Mongolia. Topographically, the mountain ranges, rising steeply above the river
basins of Manchuria on the east, mark the western rim of the Mongolian plateau.
South and east of the main
line of the Great Xing'an range is the broken country of the western headwaters
of the Liao River, and further south the river valleys about Chengde in
northern Hebei. This region, particularly the territory of present-day western Liaoning,
has been traditionally identified with the homeland of the Eastern Barbarians (donghu),
and modern archaeology has discovered numbers of sites of tombs, with bronze
weapons and utensils, in the valleys region of the Laoha River system. Further
north, two peaks of the Great Xing'an range, Wuhuan Mountain in Liaoning and
Xianbi Mountain in Jilin, are described by legend as the original homes of
those two peoples.
Regardless of the truth of
such detailed identifications, it may be accepted that the Wuhuan and the
Xianbi were originally inhabitants of the mountains and forests of this region,
and that the lands of the Wuhuan were initially south and somewhat west of the
Xianbi. From this country, however, the Wuhuan first and then the Xianbi came into
contact with the Chinese to the south and with the steppe people of the Xiongnu
confederacy to the west.
The western slopes of the
Great Xing'an range merge gradually into the Inner Mongolian plateau, some 1000
metres above sea level. The mountains act as a barrier to the rainfall: the
annual rainfall at Shenyang is about 700 mm [28 inches] and at Harbin almost
600 mm [24 inches], and the mountain country receives about 500 mm per year,
but to the north and west the readings reduce to 250 mm [10 inches] and below. With
low rainfall and long cold winters, the forest country gives way to grassy
steppe, and again, in the north and west of Inner Mongolia, to desert.
From the point of view of Han
China, the region beyond the frontiers can be considered in three segments,
extending roughly north and south. On the east, the mountains of the Manchurian
border lead down to the plateau, with internal drainage, light rainfall, and
steppe grasslands surrounding and interspersed with desert.
In the central section, west
of the railway line which leads from Datong and Jining to Ulaanbaatar, the
steppe grasslands north of Huhhot and the Ordos extend, through some poor
country, to the river country of the Orhon. Northeast of the Edsin Gol, and
northwest of the loop of the Yellow River, a peak of the Gurvan Sayhan Uul
range, in the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, was known to the Han
as Zhuoye Mountain, and was a landmark for armies and travellers on the steppe.
North of these hills is the useful stream of the Ongin River.
Further to the west again,
from the region of present-day Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the heart of the
Gobi Desert is a barrier between the Gansu corridor and the Altai Mountains,
with other ridges such as the Gurvan Sayhan Uul northeast of Edsin Gol. North
of the Altai, in the western part of the Mongolian Republic, there are again
rivers and lakes, a drainage system separated from the Orhon system by the mass
of the Hangayn Nuruu. From this western region, it is possible to cross the
Altai mountains and the desert south to the oasis cities of modern Xinjiang,
the Western Regions of Han, or west into the steppe country of Dzungaria, north
of modern Turfan and Urumchi.
In this region, the southwest
of Mongolia on the borders of modern Xinjiang, the region about Hami was a
point of importance on the route from the steppe lands of the Xiongnu to the
oasis cities of central Asia. North of Hami, the high ground of the Barkol Tagh
produces streams which irrigate the lower grasslands and lead into Lake Barkol.
In Han times, the Barkol Tagh were known as the Tian Shan, and the steppe
country there, Yiwu, was a notable territory of the western Xiongnu state.
The three segments described
above, however, extend northwards from the long arc of the Han imperial
frontier, to the central region of the Orhon basin and the region of modern
Ulaanbaatar, in a broad gap between the Hentiyn Nuruu mountains on the east and
the Hangayn Nuruu to the west. There, some 800 kilometres from the line of the
Great Wall of Qin and Han, the grassland and arid country of the Mongolian
plateau gives way to mountains and fertile river valleys draining north into
Lake Baikal. Though the winters are cold and the growing season short, the
rainfall is affected by the Siberian climate rather than by the remnants of the
monsoon pattern of China, and the country supplies excellent pasture.
Unlike other regions of the
Gobi, the territory south of Ulaanbaatar is not particularly difficult to
traverse: besides the railway to the southeast, other routes lead southwest to
the Edsin Gol and below the Hangayn Nuruu into western Mongolia. More
generally, this region is capable of supporting considerable flocks and herds
and a significant population of pastoralists. So the triangle between the Ulaanbaatar/Orhon
region in the north, the Ordos loop of the Yellow River and the Sanggan valley
in the southeast, and the Edsin Gol corridor in the southwest was a centre of
power in the Xiongnu state. Furthermore, in the history which is to follow,
primarily concerned with the policies and activities of the Han government
against the peoples and states of the north, this central triangle of
geographical Mongolia was of notable military importance, since it was
comparatively easy for armies to traverse on raids and punitive expeditions
between north and south.
In general terms, therefore, looking upon geographical Mongolia as
a whole, one may note the different regions of mountain forest merging
to steppe in the east, the fertile crescent of grassland north along
the Great Wall frontier of China Proper, the prosperous basin of the
Orhon River in the north, and the more isolated region beyond the Altai,
further to the west towards central Asia. As Owen Lattimore has observed,
the zone of political activity has traditionally been in the margin
lands of the frontier between China and the steppe, but one may see
in the Han period that the essential axis of power extended northwards
to the lands of the Orhon.
The military system of Later Han
The first section of this
chapter discussed the arrangements for the civil administration and local
defence of the frontier provinces. It is necessary and appropriate, however, to
consider the military resources which the government of Later Han might bring
to bear in times of emergency or for major campaigns.
The core military force of the
empire was the Northern Army, stationed at the imperial capital, Luoyang. It
comprised five regiments, each with some eight hundred officers and men: the
Garrison Cavalry (tunji), the Elite Cavalry (yueji), the Archers
Who Shoot at a Sound (shesheng), the Footsoldiers (bubing), and the
Chang River Regiment.[5] Each regiment was commanded
by a colonel. A junior officer, the Captain of the Centre of the Northern Army,
was responsible for the overall supervision and discipline of these troops, but
colonelcies of the regiments were frequently granted to members of the clans of
the imperial relatives by marriage, and during Later Han the senior male of the
distaff relatives, with a title such as General in Chief or General of Chariots
and Cavalry, often held formal command of these troops. In times of domestic
crisis, the Northern Army could be an important political weapon.
The chief purpose of the
Northern Army, however, was to act as the central strategic reserve of the
empire. These were the elite guards, and although their regular duties involved
the protection of the emperor's capital, they could be sent on active service
as stiffening for regular troops, local levies and non-Chinese auxiliaries. Few
major campaigns took place without one or more of the five regiments.
The day-to-day and formal
guard duties of the emperor's palace and other official establishments were
carried out by two other formations. The Gentlemen of the Household were
organised in five units, under the command of the Generals of the Gentlemen of
the Household for All Purposes (wuguan zhonglangjiang), of the Left and
of the Right, Rapid as Tigers (huben) and of the Feathered Forest (yulin).
The first three of these were in fact composed of men who had been recommended
by their local commanderies and who were serving a period of probation before
being appointed to substantive civil rank. The number of men in the three units
combined varied between 700 and 2000, but they could not be regarded as a real
military force. The Gentlemen Rapid as Tigers and the Gentlemen of the
Feathered Forest, numbering some 1500 and 1700 respectively, were of more
practical use. The Gentlemen of the Feathered Forest, in particular, were
chosen from the sons and grandsons of men who had died in battle, and also from
worthy families of the northwest. It is possible, though there is no firm
evidence, that the Feathered Forest may have provided a form of military
cadetship similar to that of three civilian units.
The duties of the Gentlemen of
the Household were largely ceremonial, and the actual work of guarding the
palace, the administrative offices, the imperial parks and tombs, and other
places of government importance was entrusted to ordinary guards, conscripted
from the empire as a whole, and probably serving for a period of no more than
twelve months. These were the men who kept the gates and doors, and acted as
escorts to high officials and to members of the imperial family.
Neither the Gentlemen of the
Household nor the conscript guards could be regarded as professional soldiers. They
took no part in campaigns; nor, indeed, were they ever considered a match for
the troops of the Northern Army in any coup d'état. It is likely that each year
some conscripts transferred to the regular units of the Northern Army, but that
would represent their first experience of serious training as part of a
disciplined force. The majority returned to their homes after their period of
service and were incorporated into the local militia.
During the Later Han dynasty,
there was a distinction between the commanderies of the frontier provinces and
those within the empire. In Former Han, the men of all commanderies and
kingdoms had been liable for military service, supervised by the Chief
Commandant (or Palace Commandant zhongwei in a kingdom), which entailed
a period of training as a Skilled Soldier (caiguan), Cavalryman (jishi)
or sailor in a Towered Warship (louchuan), followed by a year of service
at the capital, on the frontier or in the provinces. Thereafter, they returned
home to the local militia, which held an annual exercise and inspection each
autumn.
It appears that the system of
Later Han was considerably less demanding. We are told that early in the reign
of Emperor Guangwu, in 30 AD, among the inner commanderies of the empire the
position of Chief Commandant was reduced to Commandant, and the annual
manoeuvres were discontinued. In the following year, the units of Skilled
Soldiers, Cavalrymen and sailors were also disbanded, and training was
thereafter carried out through the organisation of People's Sections (minwu),
presumably a form of home guard.
Bielenstein has argued that
this change was only short-term, and has pointed out, quite correctly, that the
system of liability for conscription remained. However, there are three points
which put his full argument into question. Firstly, there are no further
references in Later Han material to the Skilled Soldiers or other such units. Second,
there are almost no occasions recorded in Later Han where troops from inner
commanderies were used for any operations except those dealing with local
banditry and minor rebellion. Thirdly, there is a sad and eloquent passage from
the Hanguan yi of Ying Shao, quoted in the commentary to the Treatise of
Officials in Hou Han Shu, where this scholar of the second century AD
deplores the weakness and lack of training of the local militia, and ascribes
the fault directly to the changes made by Emperor Guangwu: " to send men into battle without having trained them is simply to
throw them away."[6]
At the beginning of Later Han,
as the civil war drew to its close, Guangwu's intention was clearly to reduce
the number of men under arms, and to lessen the likelihood of future
insurrections within the empire. There is a good deal to be said for the
argument that it is better to have an essentially unarmed and untrained
population, if you cannot be certain of its loyalty; and the new policy, of
course, meant a reduction in the military ability of future bandits and rebels,
as well as those of the local loyal forces. From the evidence above, it appears
that this remained the policy of the Later Han government, and although
conscription was maintained for light military duties, there was no attempt to
restore the Former Han tradition of a nation under arms and an effective
militia.
As a result of this change,
the men of the inner commanderies had small contribution to make to the
military resources of the empire. Already in Former Han, a system of commutation
for military service had been established - a development which was inevitable
when each man owed a short period of service in a territory as distant as the
lands of the Gansu corridor. It seems clear that this continued, and the
military tax (gengfu) was a notable source of revenue for the
government.
It was still necessary,
however, to put the men on the ground. On the northern frontiers, of course,
every man was liable for active and then militia service in defence of his
home, while regular forces were still obtained from the inner commanderies. There
is no information as to how these latter were recruited, though it was
possibly, as suggested above, by voluntary transfer at the end of the period of
conscription. Besides the Northern Army, there was certainly provision for
recruitment and training of regular troops outside the capital. In particular,
the Encampment at Liyang, near the Yellow River in Wei commandery in the west
of the Yellow Plain, which had a complement of 1000 men, is known to have
served as a source of supply for the command of the General Who Crosses the
Liao stationed in the north of the Ordos. Similarly, there were the camps of
the garrison at Yong and of the Tiger Tooth Chief Commandant at Chang'an
established later in the dynasty. These units served as stationary defence
positions, but they could also be used on active campaign on the frontier.
Finally, one must consider the
problem of the Great Wall: we can be reasonably certain about its physical
position upon the ground in the time of Later Han, but it is by no means
certain as to when, and in what areas, it was actually maintained as a part of
the defensive system of the north.
There is no question that,
properly maintained and fully manned, the Great Wall served as an integral part
of an effective system of defence, particularly suitable for dealing with a
highly mobile enemy such as the northern nomads. In simplest terms, the
existence of this artificial barrier regained the initiative for an inevitably
slow-moving defence. Where a swift raiding party of main striking force would,
in the normal course of events, be able to attack any point in the defensive
perimeter and achieve local surprise, the Wall presented an immediate obstacle
to the attackers' freedom of movement. The mounted enemy, faced with the Wall,
must either break through one of the gates, or scale the obstacle with ramps,
cranes and ropes. In either case, with guards at the gates, pickets on the
watchtowers and regular patrols along the line of fortifications, the enemy's
approach would be discovered and information about his strength and movement
could be sent back to the main body of the local defence force. So warned, the
defence could make adequate preparations to meet the enemy; and when the
attackers lost the fight they had again to deal with the Wall as an obstacle to
their retreat.
The wooden slips recovered
from the desert regions of the north-western frontier of Han, particularly
those found at sites along the Edsin Gol, provide impressive evidence of the
professional attitude and the administrative effectiveness of the Han
garrisons. There are reports of equipment maintained in the watchtowers, both
for defence and for signalling, there are records of patrols carried out and
incidents investigated, and there are regular files for the men engaged, their
daily duties, and the accounts of travellers as they passed through the guard-points
and passes.
The dating of the strips does
not give a complete record of the occupation of the Wall, but it does appear that
the military establishment in the northwest was maintained for most of the
Later Han period, and in that region the fixed defence provided by the Wall was
evidently the most effective and satisfactory.
Loewe, however, has estimated
that some 3250 men may have been required for watchtowers along the Wall from
Dunhuang to Wuwei, including the Edsin Gol/Juyan salient; and this figure takes
no account of the second line troops, such as those engaged in agriculture or
at headquarters, nor for any strategic reserve.[7] On the basis of this
estimate, the resources available to the military commanders in Bing and You
provinces may not have permitted them to keep so many troops in fixed positions
along their section of the Wall, while also maintaining a reserve sufficiently
powerful to come to their assistance in time of need. It is not a question of
the Wall being an inefficient form of defence: it is rather a matter whether
the manpower was available for its effective use.
In the two hundred years of the Later Han dynasty, we may observe a
number of policies being applied to the problem of the northern frontier.
The problem was set by the geography of the region, and the natural
differences between the peoples of the steppe and the economy and society
of China. The government of the empire sought to achieve a solution
to the problem by political, administrative and military means but,
like all governments, its resources were limited, and its policies were
often confused by conflicting advice and demands. The achievement of
government may be judged by the record of success with the material
at hand, and the pages which follow offer an assessment of the policies
and achievement of the Later Han government in the north.
NOTES
[1] The Liao River,
which flows through Manchuria, had given its name to a general's command in
Former Han, but the office revived by Later Han dealt only with the north and
had no concern with the northeast.
[2]
There was a period during Former Han and the beginning of Later Han
that the name of Shuofang was given both to a commandery and also to a
short-lived provincial administration based upon that territory.
[3]
Hou Renzhi, Lishi dili xue de lilun yu shijian, Shanghai
1979.
[4]
My interpretation of the site of the Dependent State of Liaodong,
about the valley of the Daling He, differs from that of the majority of Chinese
scholars. I presented detailed arguments on the question in the original
publication of Northern Frontier at pages 460-465, being note 53 to
Chapter 1.
[5]
Following the settlement of northeast in the 50s, the Chang River
regiment was made up of Wuhuan horsemen, with a special Major of Barbarian
Cavalry to attend to them.
[6]
Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, Cambridge UP 1975, 114
and 191 note 2, argues that the military program suffered only a temporary
suspension. More recently, Mark E Lewis, "The Han Abolition of Universal
Military Service," in Warfare in Chinese History, edited by Hans
van de Ven, Leiden 2000, 33-75, has added further support and additional
conclusions to my arguments here.
[7]
Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration, Cambridge UP
1967, I, 90-91
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